

**UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE.**

Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität  
Institut für Politikwissenschaft  
1<sup>st</sup> Supervisor: Dr. Mathias Freise

University of Twente  
School of Management and Governance  
Department of Business Administration  
2<sup>nd</sup> Supervisor: Dr. Liqin Brouwers-Ren

## **Bachelor Thesis**

# **The Influence of National Interests on the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy**

Exemplified by a Case Study of the European Union's Arms Embargo on  
China

**Lisa Peiler**

**Public Administration/ European Studies**  
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## **List of acronyms**

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

European Commission (Commission)

European Council (Council)

European Parliament (Parliament)

European Union (EU)

Member States (MS)

Not available (n.a.)

People's Republic of China (China)

Treaty of the European Union (TEU)

United States (U.S.)

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## 1. Introduction

### 1.1. Research background and research objective

Along with striving for European integration, the desire to develop the European institutions as an instrument of foreign and security policy emerged. Although a majority of the European population is in favor of an effective European foreign policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has so far achieved no significant breakthrough and has only a subordinate role in the daily operations of the European Union (EU) (Zepter, 2009). Especially in comparison to its economic power, the lack of effectiveness of the CFSP becomes obvious: "Economically a giant, politically a dwarf" (Fröhlich, 2008, p. 11). Due to its supranational and intergovernmental character, the EU rather portrays a system "sui generis" and is not easily assimilable into existing categories of governance. Besides, the CFSP is a framework of supranational as well as intergovernmental arrangements and the EU enjoys only shared competences in this policy field. As a result, the common foreign policy is closely connected to the national foreign policies of the Member States (MS) (Kernic, 2007). A lack of united positions, poor coherence and parallel foreign policies by the MS are only some consequences (Fröhlich, 2008).

This thesis discusses the relation of the MS and the CFSP. More precisely, the thesis aims to investigate to what extent the interests of MS influence a common and coherent appearance of the CFSP. The ambiguity of the EU as an international actor, on the one hand as an important economical player and on the other hand as a negligible foreign policy actor, has great political relevance and engages the political science literature strongly. Does the "Westphalian model" of international relations remain dominant in the future or will there be a new global governance order due to interregional relations? The significance of the MS interests and influences as well as power politics motives play a key role in shaping the CFSP and are important in order to discover and scrutinize the concept of the EU foreign policy (Bendiek & Kramer, 2009). In recent years, numerous authors have been trying to answer the central question regarding the position and function of the EU in the international system, particular the way in which the EU is constituted as a new global actor. Do the MS continue to be the most important actors of CFSP or is there indeed a *Common* Foreign and Security Policy, which bears this name with justification (Kernic, 2007)? Previous research, however, could not agree on a clear conclusion

and still many questions remain unanswered. Especially in terms of increasing international interdependence this has significance not only for the states concerned but also for the international community. This displays the topic's relevance for European studies and international relations. Next to the objective of contributing to a better understanding of the CFSP, the thesis also aims to provide directions for a successful future development of this policy field.

For the purpose of achieving this research objective, I developed the following research question:

**To what extent is the CSFP hostage of national interests of its MS?**

According to Moravcsik (1998), two major aspects shape national interests: sovereignty and economic interests.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, I will answer the research question by dividing it into two sub-questions, which will be examined in the empirical part of my study:

**To what extent is the CSFP hostage of economic interests of its MS?**

**To what extent is the CSFP hostage of sovereignty interests of its MS?**

## **1.2. Structure and Approach**

My results of the theoretical part will be empirically verified in a study of the MS's attitude towards the EU arms embargo towards China in the period from 2003 to 2005. The embargo can be seen as a sanction to urge was established as a reaction to the Tiananmen incident in June 1989 when the Chinese military violently suppressed protest of the population. Especially students demonstrated at the Tiananmen Square (天安门) in Beijing for more democracy (European Council, 1989). With the defeat of the uprising by the military "Hundreds, and possibly thousands, of people were killed in the massacre, although it is unlikely a precise number will ever be known." (BBC News, n.a.) In the same month, the European Council (Council) decided to impose sanctions against China (European Council, 1989); however, these were gradually cancelled from October 1990 onwards. Nevertheless, the arms embargo continued to exist until today (Algieri, 2009). Between 2003 and 2005, the EU has been discussing the abandoning of the arms embargo (Men, 2009). The debate about lifting the embargo demonstrates the multitude of divergent interests of different

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<sup>1</sup> See Theoretical Framework: 2.3.3. Hypothesis

actors' interests which are characterizing the EU-Chinese relationship: European MS, EU institutions<sup>2</sup>, economic actors and other international powers such as the United States (U.S.) (Algieri, 2009).

Recently, the role of China is becoming increasingly important in terms of European policy-making. However, the EU currently faces “a structural difficulty in coordinating their approach to China” (European Foreign Policy Scorecard, 2010). Particularly the EU-China relations of recent years are exemplary of the internal contradiction of the EU: To promote norms and values in its foreign policy on the hand, and to not reach the necessary consensus among the MS for implementation on the other hand (Bendiek & Kramer, 2009). In the following Bachelor-thesis, it is analyzed what causes these “fundamental divergence of national interests (...) vis-à-vis China” (European Foreign Policy Scorecard, 2010) especially regarding a common EU foreign policy towards human rights violations in China. Why do the MS fail to significantly contribute to the protection of human rights in “The Middle Kingdom”<sup>3</sup>, but rather allow China to “exploit differences between two presidents and one high representative, not to mention the European Parliament, which now also plays a role in foreign policy” (European Foreign Policy Scorecard, 2010)?

In order to answer my research question “*To what extend is the CSFP hostage of national interests of its MS?*” I will analyze whether national interest of MS are in opposition to a uniform appearance of the EU as an international actor. Particularly, I will outline which countries are in favor and against of lifting the ban and what are the driving factors behind their attempt to lift respectively continue this embargo?

The information for the theoretical part of my thesis I mainly derived from scientific articles in political journals and from books which thematize the European foreign policy, the EU as a global actor and international relations. I also use data from the Internet. In the empirical part of my analysis I gain my data mainly out of EU publications, legislative texts, scientific journals and newspaper articles on the subject. I evaluate this information in a qualitative content analysis according to Mayring, which examines documents with a theory-driven research question and coding scheme (Mayring, 2010). This research design is suitable for answering my research question since most of the data concerning my topic is available in written

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<sup>2</sup> Especially the European Commission (Commission), European Council (Council), European Parliament (Parliament)

<sup>3</sup> Translation of the Chinese name for China: 中国

documents and the design “is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents” (Bowen, 2009, p. 1). Additionally, a qualitative research design is viewed as a suitable way to examine hypotheses when experiments or other quantitative designs cannot be used which applies to my thesis (Shadish, Cook, & Campell, 2002).

My research approach is to examine national interests of the MS as an independent variable and a coherent CFSP as the dependent variable to be influenced.

This explicit and qualitative analysis of the EU arms embargo in connection with national interests and preferences of MS portrays an added value to the research of the CFSP. Little research has been done regarding attitudes towards the EU arms embargo when analyzing MS preferences shaping the CFSP. Therefore, a relevant research gap for my thesis has opened.

Following in chapter two, I will outline the theoretical part of my thesis, in which I will present various authors and theories in more detail. On this theoretical basis, a hypothesis is developed. Subsequent in chapter three, my methodical approach for the empirical part in chapter four is described. In this chapter the generated hypothesis is tested on the example of the arms embargo in view of the consistent application of the theory. Chapter five outlines the results of my research and finally, chapter six summarizes my findings with respect to my research question.

## **2. Theoretical Framework**

### **2.1. Introduction**

Below, an review of existing literature follows in order to outline what research has already been done on the topic and also guide to research gaps which I conduct my research.

Sufficient literature on the topic of my thesis is to be found. Especially in the field of EU foreign policy issues and its problems, I was able to gather much information. There are many articles on the lack of coherence, MS interests and political power motives which influence the CFSP (Tonra & Christiansen, 2004; Smith, 2008; Fröhlich, 2008; Kernic, 2007). The literature mainly states difficulties in generating a common political position and the lack of a common political will within the CFSP

as its major problem (Smith, 2008; Fröhlich, 2008). Although Baylis (2008) and Fröhlich (2008) also emphasize the progress in the development of the CFSP and the development of the EU as an international actor<sup>4</sup>, a lack of conceptual clarity and parallel foreign policies of the MS within the CFSP are criticized at the same time (Fröhlich, 2008). Furthermore, Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2008) stresses the fact that the recent improvement is in contrast to the adherence to unanimous as the dominant decision rule in the EU council. Fröhlich (2008) claims that this status of the CFSP is not appropriate taking into account the deep supranational interdependence in other EU policy areas such as the Economic and Monetary Union of the EU. Orbie (2008) and Kernic (2007) both point out that it is inevitable for an analysis the EU as an international actor to detach from a specification of a state-like structure. Since the EU is not integrable into term as state or nation, a new approach for the evaluation of the EU must be found.

According to Smith (2008), a major problem for incoherent CFSP is the “logic of diversity” (p.13) which implies that MS response differently to international issues since they affected with different extents. Furthermore, MS “will seek to protect their national interests” (p.10) and “[a]ny ‘foreign policy’ formulated at EU level is inconsequential and weak because it represents the lowest common denominator” (p.10). The MS’s desire to pursue national interests first is also recognized by Katsioulis (2008): Even though, the MS agreed on several important innovations<sup>5</sup> regarding the EU foreign policy in the Lisbon Treaty, the “Reform Treaty” still features strong national reservations regarding sovereignty as well as reluctance to transfer foreign policy competences to the EU level (Katsioulis, 2008). This MS’s reluctance to surrender further core areas of sovereignty – especially in terms of foreign policy – to the supranational level of the EU results in a parallelism of national, coordinated, and common foreign policies within the EU (Aschenbrenner, 2000). Especially in areas where the EU acts as a normative power the weakness of the EU becomes evident: Where the Union promotes values and principles beyond its institutional and territorial boundaries, the weak point of embedding normative guidelines into a coherent strategy and concepts of common interests becomes

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<sup>4</sup> Such as the military Operation Atalanta conducted by the European Union Naval Force off the coast of Somalia (European Union Naval Force Somalia, 2012)

<sup>5</sup> The position of the “European Union’s High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” combined with the position of the “Vice-President of the European Commission” (a “double hat” of intergovernmental and supranational competences), the initiation of the “European External Action Service” and a stronger emphasis on the role of member states in the “Common Foreign and Security Policy”



notable (Fröhlich, 2008). While Jopp& Schlotter (2007) identify significant predictors of a further development towards a more coherent and common EU foreign policy, Tonra & Christiansen (2004) view the future of the EU foreign policy “as an ongoing puzzle” (p.1). Due to the MS “caution to move beyond intergovernmental decision-making mechanism” (Tonra & Christiansen, 2004, p. 1), the direction for further development of the CFSP is uncertain.

As written above, up to the present day, the analytical study of the role and status of the EU as an international actor entails a number of difficulties and theoretical problems. One of the biggest challenges for the scientific analysis of the Union originates from the problem to determine the complex system of EU in an adequate manner. It reveals the problem that the EU is neither a state in the classical sense, yet can be categorized as an international organization (Kernic, 2007). Therefore, a definition of the character of the EU is exhibited below. The conception of the CFSP is also clarified. Through this conceptualizations, “imprecise concepts are made more specific and precise” (Babbie, 2012, p. 127).

## **2.2. Conceptualization of EU and CFSP**

### **2.2.1. Character of the international actor EU**

Any analysis of the EU as an international actor is struggling with the inevitable problem that in the political science theory, the term actor is closely associated with the concepts of state, nation and sovereignty. The EU, however, is not constituted in a manner that complies with these terms and concepts in full. Structures and procedures in the EU<sup>6</sup> have always been different from those of the concepts of international relations theory (Kernic, 2007). Also the GASP has a vague character which is open for interpretation: The MS deliberately created both the CFSP and its precursor, the European Political Cooperation, as pragmatic but also self-contradictory institutions which allow for different theoretical interpretations (Fröhlich, 2008). The structure of the CFSP is between the poles of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. But the actual dilemma is, however, that recognition of the EU as an independent and autonomous actor on the international stage implicates a challenge of character and status of the MS (Kernic, 2007). At the

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<sup>6</sup> And also former European Community

same time, this challenged character of the MS is the main focus and basis for realistic theories.

This new and specific character of the EU is often described as an "actor sui generis" (Jopp & Schlotter, 2007). Although this description is basically just a stopgap solution to the dilemma in which the research is situated is this a way to examine the complex structure of the EU through the glasses of International Relations theory (Kernic, 2007). Consequently, I define the EU as an "actor sui generis" to express the fact that the EU is historically unique and not comparable to other existing state structures or international association (Zandonella, 2005).

### **2.2.2. European Common Foreign and Security Policy**

The CFSP is a policy area of EU external relations, which are a subarea of the International Relations. CFSP describes an in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) agreed mechanism for cooperation between EU MS with the aim to gradually arrive at a common foreign and security policy. The arrangements for CFSP replace the European Political Cooperation which has been in practice since the 1970s (Schubert & Klein, 2006). According to the TEU, the CFSP includes all areas of foreign and security policy. However, the EU MS only together display international noticeable weight: the greater the unity and coherence of EU external action, the greater the capacity of the EU (Federal Foreign Office Germany, 2012). The CFSP<sup>7</sup> is regulated under Title V in Article 21 - 46 TEU and is distinguished by special characteristics: It is not communitized but created intergovernmental (European Union, 2006). Apart from a few exceptions<sup>8</sup>, the MS decide unanimously on CFSP matters and its future direction and in this way exercise to some extent the executive power of the CFSP. This occurs through decisions in the monthly meeting of the Council for External Relations<sup>9</sup>. The Treaty of Lisbon did not change the intergovernmental character of CFSP. The Commission has a relatively minor role<sup>10</sup>, while the High Representative for the CFSP shall ensure the consistency of EU external actions. Next to the CFSP, the MS also exert their national foreign politics, however, the MS are required to act "in accordance with the Treaties" (Art. 24 TEU)

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<sup>7</sup> The former "second pillar" of the EU

<sup>8</sup> See Art. 31 TEU

<sup>9</sup> Foreign Ministers of EU Member States and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

<sup>10</sup> No right of initiative, no significant executive tasks, they can only support the High Representative of the Council (Art. 30 TEU)

and to do nothing that would contradict with the CFSP (Federal Foreign Office Germany, 2012). The sui generis nature of the EU is particularly important for the conceptualization of the CFSP, since a central authority is - despite the institutionalization - still absent (Jopp & Schlotter, 2007)

### **2.3. Theories approaching cooperation in the CFSP**

An additional problem when considering the CFSP is the approach of very different theoretical perspectives. Next to traditional theories such as Idealism, Realism, and Constructivism more modern theories such as Neo-realism, Neo-liberalism or the Liberal Intergovernmentalism theorize the EU foreign policy. For this study, however, the theory of Realism appears appropriate. Realism focuses on power and interests as the main principles of states and politics. This rational understanding as an approach to EU foreign policy and to the CFSP in particular provides a powerful explanation for incoherence in the CFSP. However, also the approach of the Liberal Intergovernmentalism is most suitable for my research because it can explain the conditions under which states do cooperate and when the CFSP is coherent (Jopp & Schlotter, 2007). The literature acknowledges a certain ambiguity between Realistic and Institutionalistic approaches towards the CFSP (Fröhlich, 2008) and the Liberal Intergovernmentalism accepts many statements of Realism. Therefore, I will first examine the realist theory to serve as a basis for the following theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism.

#### **2.3.1. Realism**

A rationalist understanding of politics is assumed by most approaches to CFSP. According to this view, international politics is a never-ending conflict for control and power caused by the characteristics of human nature (classical realism) and/or the anarchical system (structural realism). Consequently, MS are controlled by anxiety, envy and precariousness and aim at enlarging their influence, power and security (Dunne & Schmidt, 2008). With reference to the GASP, the MS exploit the EU institutions for their own advantages and remain to have the most power and last control. By adhering to the national veto power in Art 31 TEU, the MS remain "Masters of the Treaties" (Fröhlich, 2008). The intergovernmental institution CFSP is seen as a result of power political considerations and negotiations. Supranational institutions, such as the Commission, play only a subordinate role to the interests of

the MS. A common foreign policy can be decided in a large intersection of common interests from the MS. However, these common policies are always endangered by single MS stepping out of line (Jopp & Schlotter, 2007). With reference to the EU arms embargo towards China, this view assumes that the MS' attitude towards the ban is always depending on the fact which position is most advantageous to them. Next to the MS' viewpoint on the arms embargo, the resulting relationship with China must also be taken in account.

The realistic perspective considers the development of the CFSP not from the EU level but from a national point of view. Thus, the basic assumption for my analysis under the following realistic perspective is that CFSP institutions and procedures are dependent of the interests and perspectives of the MS. On the basis of logical behavior of states in an anarchical system, the shape and implementation of the GASP is according to MS interests to protect their interests and to enlarge their powers (Fröhlich, 2008). It is "the duty of the statesperson to calculate rationally the most appropriate steps that should be taken so as to perpetuate the life of the state in a hostile and threatening environment" (Dunne & Schmidt, 2008, p. 92). All in all, the realist theory implies that MS will be in favor of lifting the arms embargo if that step enlarges their power and is in line with their interests. Vice versa, MS which do not expect benefits from the lifting the sanction or which interests are best served by a continuation of the ban will be against the abolition of the arms embargo.

As disadvantages of this theory can be stated that the Westphalian sovereign state is increasingly challenged (Dunne & Schmidt, 2008). According to Dunne & Schmidt (2008) the use of Realism as theory becomes „Increasingly problematic in the present age of globalization" (p. 103). The theory lacks an explanation regarding the submission of sovereignty and international cooperation. Furthermore, it is criticized that Realism underestimates the importance of common interests and non-state actors (Dunne & Schmidt, 2008). However, many points of criticism concerning the lack of explanatory power can be solved by the Liberal Institutionalism theory.

### **2.3.2. Liberal Institutionalism**

"Liberal Institutionalists accept many of the assumptions of Realism (...), but argue that institutions can provide a framework for cooperation which can help to overcome the dangers of security competition between states" (Baylis, 2008, p. 234). This theory functions mainly within the Realist framework; however, while realists

neglect the importance of institutions to reach national interests, the Liberal Institutionalism acknowledges international institutions as an essential instrument to acquire security and power. Through cooperation, states can profit since International Relations are not perceived as a zero-sum game but as a win-win situation (Lemke, 2008). Furthermore, mutual interdependence can emerge among the states. This interdependence reduces the anarchic structure and encourages further cooperation: Institutions such as the CFSP can decrease transaction costs, make obligations and assurances more trustworthy, enable greater coordination and simplify mutual cooperation (Baylis, 2008). However, Moravcsik (1998) argues that cooperation will only occur if these institutions “strike a substantive bargain” (p. 21) for the MS. Similar to the realist approach, national preferences are seen as the driving factor for and against cooperation. Different to the realist approach is that Moravcsik underlines the fact that “national preferences are shaped through contention among domestic political groups” (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 22). Furthermore, MS will cooperate if an assertion of their preferences at the EU level empowers them on their national level (to the national opposition, social groups...).

The theory is useful because it can explain the conditions under which the CFSP is a coherent foreign policy: Domestic power arrangements and influences affect the formation of preferences at the national level. In contrast to Realism, the state is not a single actor but the product of social power relations. Common interests are bundled and incorporated into negotiations with other states. Hence it follows that generally a coherent result can only be achieved when the intersection of common and compatible interests is large enough. Consequently, joint problem solving usually stays at the level of the lowest common denominator. In this view, the CFSP is a weak institution which durability and coherence is negatively affected by intergovernmental bargaining (Jopp & Schlotter, 2007). The theory suggests that a common decision regarding the arms embargo can only be obtained if the MS share compatible interests in this issue. If some MS benefit through a removal of the embargo but other MS have their interests satisfied by a preservation of it, a coherent CFSP will be unlikely to emerge.

Limits of the theory are the fact that Liberal Institutionalism fails to appreciate the potency the global economy towards interdependence and cooperation between

national states (Lamy, 2008). Furthermore, the failure of international institutions<sup>11</sup> to efficiently fight issue such as environmental pollution or poverty is viewed as a proof for weaknesses in the theory. An elected government as the foundation for legitimacy of control is also neglected in the assumptions of the theory (Grieco, 1988).

**Table 1: Summary of common and different assumptions Liberal Institutionalism and Realism**

	<b>Liberal Institutionalism</b>	<b>Realism</b>
<b>Common assumptions</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. MS act in an anarchic international system</li> <li>2. MS are rational and power seeking actors</li> <li>3. MS are responsible for establishing and shaping CFSP</li> <li>4. CFSP is established on the basis of cooperation between the MS</li> <li>5. A common foreign policy can be decided in a large intersection of common interests</li> </ol>	
<b>Different assumptions</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Level of analysis: individual, society and state actors</li> <li>2. Structural principle: cooperation and interdependence</li> <li>3. CFSP enables states to collaborate</li> <li>4. CFSP promote reach of national interests</li> <li>5. Collaboration reduces transactions costs</li> <li>6. Domestic powers shape MS’s decisions</li> <li>7. Cooperation is win-win situation</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Level of analysis: state actors</li> <li>2. Structural principle: security dilemma</li> <li>3. CFSP enable states to coordinate</li> <li>4. MS exploit EU institutions for their own advantages</li> <li>5. CFSP endangered by MS stepping out of line</li> <li>6. Cooperation zero-sum game</li> </ol>

Source: based on Little (2008, pp. 298-9)

**2.3.3. Hypothesis**

On the basis of the literature reviewed, a hypothesis is developed in relation to my research question. This hypothesis is empirically tested in an analysis of MS positions to the EU arms embargo.

**When divergent interests between MS exist, then no coherent CFSP can be established.**

Divergent interests serve as the independent variable while the coherent CFSP is the dependent variable to be influenced.

Two main dimensions are named by Moravcsik (1998) which shape national preference formation: Geopolitical interests which “reflect perceived threats to national sovereignty” (p. 26) and economic interests which mirror a “large

<sup>11</sup> Such as United Nations

exogenous increase in opportunities for profitable cross-border trade and capital movements” (p. 26).

**Table 2: Assumptions of Geopolitical and Economic Interests shaping National preference formation**

	<b>Geopolitical Interests</b>	<b>Economic Interests</b>
<b>Perceived threats</b>	Threats to national sovereignty	Missing out on economic opportunities
<b>Major Bargaining Demands</b>	Geopolitical	Economic
<b>Key actors</b>	Foreign and defense ministries	Sectoral and factoral interest groups, economic officials
<b>Priority of Domestic Politics</b>	Achievement of geopolitical goals, necessary to efficiently adapt to security situation	Achievement of economic goals, necessary to efficiently adapt to economic situation

Source: based on Moravcsik (1998, p. 28)

Although both explanations for MS preferences differ in their opinion towards cooperation, I will employ both views in my analysis of national preferences shaping the CFSP respectively the MS’s attitudes towards the arms embargo. According to Moravcsik, Sovereignty claims as well as economic interests influence national decisions - in this case regarding the arms embargo - therefore both dimensions will be analyzed in order to answer my research question.

**3. Research Method**

**3.1. Functionality and usefulness of a qualitative content analysis**

In order to empirically investigate my theoretical findings, I use the research method of a qualitative content analysis according to Mayring. This qualitative method is non-experimental and observational. It systematically examines documents with a theory-driven research question and coding scheme (Mayring, 2010) in order to extract all relevant information from the literature.<sup>12</sup> Due to its character of a “qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings” (Patton, 2002, p. 453), this research design is most suitable for my analysis of mainly primary and secondary literature. The research method will be implemented in a deductive research approach which means that prior formulated and theoretical derived aspects of analysis are used to analyze the data. In this thesis, the research question and

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<sup>12</sup> See Annex 1

hypothesis are used to filter certain aspects from the data. Moreover, the technique of analysis will be a structured content analysis (Mayring, 2010).

Mayring's method will be applied in a case study and an analysis of a decision-making process in order to test the developed hypothesis for empirical verification.<sup>13</sup> The case study will examine four MS representing different points of view. Contrary, the analysis of decision-making processes within the EU examines all MS significantly involved in the procedure of finding a decision on the embargo.

Mayring recommends the quality criteria of reliability and validity to make conclusions about the accuracy of measurements used. Reliability describes the comprehensibility of the procedure: A repetition of an experiment must be replicable and give the same results under similar conditions. Validity delineates the quality of operationalisation, namely to what extent the measurement instrument actually measures what it demands to evaluate (Mayring, 2010). An evaluation of these two criteria succeeds at the end of my empirical analysis.

Although this approach of a non-experimental and observational design is most suitable for answering my research question<sup>14</sup>, it has also weak points and disadvantages (Shadish, Cook, & Campell, 2002). A non-experimental design is usually conducted "without manipulation or control of the researcher" (Gerring, 2012, p. 274) and is therefore observational. Furthermore, no control group or pretest is used and the treatment as well as units cannot be randomized. This can lead to various threats of validity such as the lack of random assignment involves "a significant loss of external validity" (Gerring, 2012, p. 273).

## **3.2. Connection between theory and empirics**

### **3.2.1. Description of available data and development of analysis categories**

Information for the empirical part of my study can be gained from EU publications such as protocols, press releases, and legislative texts concerning the arms embargo towards China. Furthermore, newspaper and journal articles with reference to the issue are available. In order to acquire a profound and no one-sided image of the topic, I tried to include data from different and many sources. While I used EU

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<sup>13</sup> See 3.2.3. Justification of case selection

<sup>14</sup> since an experimental or a quantitative design is not possible to conduct in the framework of this bachelor thesis



publications for general facts about the embargo, articles from journals and newspapers were useful to get an insight into MS's interests and positions. Therefore, this data is appropriate for testing the theories I have discussed. My analysis focuses primarily on data from the period between 2003 and 2005 since an abolishment of the embargo was intensively discussed within the EU during this time. The data used in the subsequent analysis has a qualitative character and is collected in an unobtrusive data collection method<sup>15</sup>. The documents that I have examined are in written form and are either in English or German language.

In a critical evaluation of the data, it might transfer a distorted image of the issue. Although I tried to develop a diversified data source, namely official EU and state documents as well as journal and newspaper articles, I cannot guarantee to have developed an unbiased illustration of the situation.

In the following, two analysis concepts are used for the empirical examination of the hypothesis. As mentioned above, Moravcsik (1998) mentions two dimensions which shape national attitudes: Sovereignty and economic interests. Therefore, my hypothesis and research question are evaluated under two different aspects:

**To what extent is the CSFP hostage of economic interests of its MS?**

**To what extent is the CSFP hostage of sovereignty interests of its MS?**

### **3.2.2 Operationalisation**

Below, I outline how theoretical concepts are measured. This mainly concerns the operationalisation of not directly measurable variables that I use in the empirical part.

In international relations there are different approaches to operationalise the term "interest". In relation to the theory used, I define the term "national interests" in a realist perspective in which the survival of the state is "most important to the state" (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2008, p. 584). The „behavior-oriented objectives and desires" (Weber, 1977, p. 31) by the state also include the accumulation of power (Morgenthau, 2006) which is essential to survive in anarchic world system. To protect national interests means to ensure safety and welfare of citizens and to safeguard sovereignty and integrity of the territory (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2006).

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<sup>15</sup> No direct influence of the researcher on the studied objects

“Economic interests” in this context are operationalized as all attempts by the state to promote economic development and wealth of a state (Oliveira, 2003) also connected to the motive to survive and to strengthen power. “Sovereignty interests” are defined as aspiring to “the condition of a state being free from any higher legal authority. (...) The state has supreme authority domestically and independence internationally.” (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2008, p. 587).

The independent variable „divergent interests” is operationalized as different, varying and even divergent interests of actors regarding a topic (Axelrod, 1970). “Divergent interests“ are the opposite of common interests.

The dependent variable „coherent policy” is defined as a unified and consistent policy which is not contradictory. A “coherent policy” requires that all actors work together towards a collective policy goal and that different policies by single actors do not undermine each other (European Parliament, 2010).

Finally, the term “to what extent” used in the research question is operationalized. “Extent” in this context outlines the degree, level or magnitude to which national interest influence the CFSP.

### **3.2.3. Justification of case selection**

For the empirical examination of MS’s economic interests I select a case study with four cases for analysis since a study of all 27 EU MS would go beyond the constraints of this thesis. I choose the cases of France, Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden since they are among the “countries most public with regard to the decision to review the arms embargo” (Kreutz, 2004, p. 53). Moreover, I deliberately decided to sample out countries which are in favor of lifting the arms embargo (France and Germany) and MS which are for continuation of the sanction (Netherlands and Sweden).

The single cases for my qualitative analysis are chosen on the basis of the data they are expected to supply. Furthermore, these four MS with different interests are exemplary for the 27 EU MS which each state pursuing different interests. The case selection was conducted in a nonrandomized method since I purposely chose countries and therefore had control over the selection of cases. Moreover, the analysis is done in an ex post evaluation, meaning a subsequent observation

(Gerring, 2012). A disadvantage this method of case selection is the absence of randomization and as a result no statistical inferences can be made to the population (Gerring, 2004).

The empirical analysis of sovereignty interests of the MS is done in an analysis of decision-making processes within the EU during the time from 2003 to 2005. In this part I analyze whether the MS's reluctance to transfer sovereignty to the EU level interferes with a coherent CFSP. Since it was not possible to conduct this part only analyzing four countries, all MS involved in this process are examined.

#### **4. Empirical Analysis**

##### **4.1. To what extent is the CFSP hostage of economic interest of its MS?**

Since 2003 to 2005, the arms embargo is under pressure from especially those countries that have a strong arms industry and a correspondingly powerful gun lobby: France and Germany<sup>16</sup> (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2011). As a result, the EU MS are divided by disagreement in their China policy (Fröhlich, 2008). Especially in this case, the conflict of human rights against economic interests is apparent: those countries without a substantial arms industry – such as the Netherlands and Sweden - reject an abolition of the embargo (Aschenbrenner, 2000).

Moreover, it is interesting that the “embargo takes the form of an EU Council Declaration (...) and due to the nature of this declaration, the scope of the embargo is not clearly defined” (EU Council Secretariat, 2005) and not legally binding.<sup>17</sup> Consequently, “national authorities have to consider whether the export in question would be appropriate” (EU Council Secretariat, 2005), indicating that MS have the freedom to interpret the embargo in different ways. This has led to the fact that various MS have exported arms to China, which export restriction under the embargo is questionable (Archick, Grimmett, & Kan, 2005). During the time<sup>18</sup> the embargo was heavily discussed within the EU, many politicians demanded that the current<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> See Annex 2

<sup>17</sup> “At that time the Treaty did not provide the possibility for the adoption of a legal instrument in this field” (EU Council Secretariat, 2005)

<sup>18</sup> 2003-2005

<sup>19</sup> adopted in 1998

EU Code of Conduct<sup>20</sup>, which regulates European weapon sales, should be renewed and the embargo abolished.

These mentioned arms sales led to doubts on the effectiveness of the arms embargo. But these deliveries also represent the capability and attractiveness of the Chinese market for arms exporting countries (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2004). In this context, Bitzinger (2004) underlines the fact that the EU defense industry greatly depends on exports outside of Europe because the domestic defense market within Europe is comparatively small<sup>21</sup>. According to the theory used, it is a logic consequence of a rational acting state to be in favor of an abolishment of the embargo. Subsequently, the interests of the four mentioned MS concerning the arms embargo are outlined:

### **France**

When French Defense Minister Alliot-Marie visited Beijing in summer 2003, he “publicly declared a willingness to urge the EU to relax arms restrictions on China” (Kreutz, 2004, p. 49). Again in January 2004, when Chinese President Hu Jintao completed a state visit to France, the French encouragement to lift the EU embargo was repeated by French President Chirac. During a meeting of EU foreign ministers short time later, France initiated that the “embargo should be lifted at the next EU Council meeting in March 2004”, but no decision was made during that meeting (Kreutz, 2004, p. 24) . Although the French Assembly has not been shown political unity regarding the embargo<sup>22</sup>, France was one of the strongest advocates of lifting it. Taking into account Moravcsik’s theory of national preference formation, other domestic groups - such as defense lobby groups - must have had an intense influence on Chirac’s decision to support an abolishment since the French National Assembly was rather opposing Chirac’s opinion.

Most of the literature is convinced that France's attitude towards the embargo was shaped by economic interests: Firstly, “France wants to benefit from China’s \$ 2

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<sup>20</sup> “Determined to prevent the export of equipment which might be used for internal repression or international aggression or contribute to regional instability (...)” (European Union Council, 1998, p. 2)

<sup>21</sup> US arms embargo towards China does not harm national arms industry to that extend as the EU embargo since “US arms procedures (...) have the benefit of a domestic market four times larger than all of Europe combined” (Bitzinger, 2004, p. n.a.)

<sup>22</sup> Almost half of the French delegates boycotted a speech of Hu Jintao at the French National Assembly in January 2004 and some were involved in demonstrations with human rights activists outside

billion-a-year market for defense technology while US companies are banned from it” (Webster, Watson, & Bremner, 2004). The French interpreted the arms embargo “to cover lethal items and major weapon platforms. However, certain other goods and technologies with potential military applications are not considered to fall under the embargo<sup>23</sup>” (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012). Therefore, France exported military equipment, such as the AS-365N Dauphin-2 helicopter to China, although prohibited by the embargo (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012). Furthermore, the French defense company Thales-Group<sup>24</sup> is suspected to have sent high ranking employees to Beijing in 2010 in order to detect which kind of weapons are of Chinese interest (Ulfkotte, 2011). These observations illustrate how France is acting according to a realist understanding of international relations: By being able to interpret the reach of the embargo differently, France shapes and influences the CFSP according to their interests. The interpretation of the embargo’s scope is favorable to France’s military industry and the country aspires increasing exports and following greater wealth and power.

Secondly, trade and economic relations<sup>25</sup> with China are also seen as a great factor for the French support of an end of the embargo (Bork, 2004). For example, China and France are both involved in the satellite project Galileo (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2003). French companies, who are involved in the Galileo project, such as the SNECMA<sup>26</sup> group or EADS<sup>27</sup>, lobbied for an end of the embargo since it exacerbates contacts with the Chinese partners in the venture (Kreutz, 2004). Especially the Chief Executive Officer of EADS Philippe Camus “complained that the results of Sino-French cooperation on aviation and spaceflight during the 1980s were completely destroyed by the ban” (Peiran, 2010, S. 54). France hopes that trading with China will boost the economy (Wolfe, 2004). This already happened in January 2005 when France and China signed several bilateral trade agreements for the coming years during a state visit of Hu Jintao in France (Berkofsky, 2005). However, China used these economic aspirations of France to make the end of the embargo a political top priority (Lam, 2004).

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<sup>23</sup> “though they are still subject to national export control procedures which could lead to a denial of the license required to export” (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012)

<sup>24</sup> “Thales is a long-standing partner to military and security forces around the world, providing support on the ground to increase operational effectiveness as well as ensure the highest levels of protection.” (Thales Group, 2012)

<sup>25</sup> See Annex 4

<sup>26</sup> Société Nationale d'Etudes et de Constructions de Moteurs d'Aviation

<sup>27</sup> European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company

This study of the case France depicts that a state will be in favor of lifting the embargo if that is beneficial to their national interests, such as economic advantages. France is an example par excellence how MS will step out of line but rather follow their national economic interests: the disposal of weapons and the possible visit of Thales employees to Beijing exemplify how France flouted CFSP policies in order to gain wealth through economic ties with China. France tried to get the embargo issue as high as possible on the EU agenda (Gottwald, 2005) and continued to argue to its removal within the EU (Kreutz, 2004). Because France would obviously profit through an end of the sanction, it was not willing to follow the CFSP policy but tried to shape it according to their preferences.

### **Germany**

In March 2003, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder pronounced his support for a removal of the EU arms embargo towards China (Schulte-Kulkmann, 2005). During a state visit in China in December 2003, Schröder announced his encouragement for a “Chinese request to buy nuclear plant from the Siemens AG in spite of the technology’s military potential” (Gottwald, 2005, p. 10). However, the proposed deal was heavily criticized within Germany and especially by Schröder’s<sup>28</sup> coalition partner, the “Green Party”. Similar to Chirac, Schröder faced domestic policy discrepancies concerning his China approach. Due to this domestic opposition, which was mainly provoked by human rights violations in China, the Siemens AG had to cancel its offer (Gottwald, 2005) and Schröder had to remove this disposition from his foreign-policy agenda (Berkofsky, 2005). In this case, Moravcsik’s theory of national preference formation is verified since domestic opposition shaped the Chancellor’s decision. However, one can assume that Schröder acted rational by withdrawing his offer. Heavy domestic criticism can result in a loss of electoral votes and therefore loss of domestic power.

Germany is – after the U.S. and Russia – the third largest arms exporter worldwide<sup>29</sup> (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012). Consequently, it is understandable that - despite domestic pressure - Schröder continued arguing for an end of the arms embargo. An increase in export of German arms would not only indicate greater wealth through exports but also result in an accumulation of power.

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<sup>28</sup> Schröder belonged to the Social Democratic Party

<sup>29</sup> See Annex 2

Supporting an abolishment of the embargo is therefore the rational consequence of promoting national interests. Furthermore, Schröder's attitude towards the embargo was probably shaped by economic arguments, too. China is economically one of the most important partners for Germany<sup>30</sup> (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008). From the total EU exports, German exports account for 44%. This indicates that German companies benefit most from the developing and increasing EU trade relations with China (Chan, 2004). "Germany and above all German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who is competing with French President Jacques Chirac to be China's 'best friend', is eager to expand German-Chinese business relations" (Berkofsky, 2005, p. 14). Economic ambitions were also observable in the German foreign policy during a China visit of Schröder in December 2004: The Chancellor was accompanied by 44 business leaders from companies such as Deutsche Bank, Siemens or DaimlerChrysler, "leaving hardly any room for discussing human, political, and civil rights" (Berkofsky, 2005, p. 14) while deals concerning airbus planes worth \$ 1, 3 billion and power station equipment worth \$ 280 million were agreed upon (Chan, 2004). Schröder's dedication for an end of the arms embargo is evoked by the fact that "amicable bilateral relations between Germany and China are of utmost importance for the prosperity of economic relations" (Schulte-Kulkmann, 2005, p. 30). Also the case of Germany exemplifies the influence of national interest on a coherent appearance of the CFSP. Especially Germany's economic interests are well served with a support of the embargo abolishment. Consequently, Schröder derogated from the CFSP. One can assume that a coherent conduction of the CFSP policy would result in less economic deals with China. Therefore, - as mentioned in the theory - Schröder's attitude within the CFSP represents "the duty of the statesperson to calculate rationally the most appropriate steps that should be taken so as to perpetuate the life of the state in a hostile and threatening environment" (Dunne & Schmidt, 2008, p. 92). Since no "substantive bargain" (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 21) for Germany can be reached by adapting the coherent EU policy, the country deviated from the common line but tracks its national „behavior-oriented objectives and desires" (Weber, 1977, p. 31) in order to accumulate economic wealth and power.

## **Netherlands**

The Netherlands feature a relatively small defense industry (Schubert G. , 2002) which even imports the majority of its military equipment from the U.S. (Global

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<sup>30</sup> See Annex 5,6,7

Security (a.), n.a.). Furthermore, the Netherlands are comparably transparent in outlining its arms exports (Government of the Netherlands, 2012). Annually, reports on the Netherlands Arms Export Policy are published. These publications state that during the period of 2003 – 2005, when the embargo was heavily discussed within EU, the Netherlands did not export weapons – both approved and prohibited by the Code of Conduct - to China.<sup>31</sup> Contrary to countries with a strong defense lobby, such as France or Germany, the comparably minor Dutch defense industry evoked - if any - little lobbying towards an end of the embargo. Moreover, the public debate within Netherlands was “strong anti-China and pro-human rights” (Kreutz, 2004, p. 54). This may explain the refusal of the Dutch government when a lifting of the embargo was first discussed in 2003. The case of the Netherlands demonstrates that if a MS is well served by a continuation of the embargo, it will be against the abolishment. This can be explained by the fact that the Dutch defense industry is comparably small and therefore, no substantial economic interests are served by an end of the sanction. Furthermore, a strong public debate within the Netherlands against the embargo took place. A support of the abolishment could lead to dramatic loss of electoral votes within the Netherlands. Following, opposing an end of the embargo constitutes rational acting by the Dutch government in order to preserve domestic power by the political leaders to take the opinion pro embargo.

The fact that in 2003, the Netherlands were among the MS strongest fighting against the abolishment of the embargo is interesting since the Dutch attitude towards the arms embargo changed: In late 2004, the Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende declared: "Within the EU there is a willingness toward lifting the arms embargo" (Bowley, 2004). Balkenende maintained his attitude and “cited political pressure for this decision even though the majority of the Dutch parliament was reportedly against such measures” (Kreutz, 2004, p. 54). The Prime Minister explained that being “the only country that refused to lift the embargo would lead to diplomatic problems and risk worsening economic relation with China” (Kreutz, 2004, p. 54). Also for the Netherlands, China embodies a trading partner not to be neglected. Although Dutch trading shares with China are lower than for example German shares<sup>32</sup>, Dutch exports to China rose greatly<sup>33</sup> in recent years (Statistics Netherlands,

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<sup>31</sup> According to the official publication of the Dutch government

<sup>32</sup> See Annex 8 and compare Annex 5

<sup>33</sup> In 2009, the Netherlands exported goods worth 4.6 billion euro to China, an increase by 20 percent relative to 2008.



2010). Probably due to the heavy domestic resistance, the Dutch government added the condition of a revised and strengthened EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports to its statement concerning the end of the arms ban (Kohlmeier, 2004). Dutch Europe Minister Atzo Nicolai explained that in case the embargo is lifted this “should prevent an increase in a flow of arms from Europe to China” (Deutsche Welle, n.a.). This shift in the Netherlands attitude delineates that the Dutch were in a struggle between different national interests: On the one hand, domestic power preservation by complying with the pro embargo line, but on the other hand, economic interests due to an increasing trade with China. By the use of a vague statement concerning its support of the lift, the Dutch policy makers tried to meet both interests. But the shift also indicates how easy MS are deviating from an EU foreign policy: As soon as economic interests seem more important, the Netherlands considered varying from the coherent CFSP line.

## **Sweden**

Similar to the Netherlands, “Sweden is a minor arms supplier in the world market” (Global Security (b.), n.a.). Officially, the country does not permit any export of military utensils to China (Hellström, 2010) and Sweden is generally a severe detractor of human rights violations in China (Oklestkova & Bondiguel, 2010). The Swedish domestic condemnation of human rights violations in China and the opposition of the Swedish Parliament to end the embargo even went to the extent that “the Parliamentary EU Committee reprimanded the Swedish Foreign Minister for not acting to stop the process” (Kreutz, 2004, p. 54). With the exception of the Social Democrats, all other parties in the Parliament announced their resistance to abolish the embargo. In addition to human rights concerns, Bowley (2004) argues that pressure from the U.S. influences Sweden’s resistance towards ending the ban. Parallel to the Netherlands, the Swedish government changed its completely refusing opinion towards the abolishment of the sanction. At a council meeting in December 2003, the Swedish Foreign Minister “stated that Sweden would be able to consider a lifting of the embargo” (Hellström, 2010, p. 16). The government met subsequent domestic criticism with the precondition that only with an improvement of the human rights situation in China, Sweden would fully support a lifting of the embargo. Nevertheless, the shift of opinion in the Swedish government can be seen as a “result of intensive Chinese lobbying” (Hellström, 2010, p. 16) and pressure (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2003). Alike other

EU MS, Sweden intensified economic ties with China evermore. China currently ranks fourth after the EU MS, Norway, and the U.S. as Sweden's main trading partner (World Trade Organization, 2010 (d.)).<sup>34</sup> Sweden is a very similar case to the Netherlands as its original interests seemed to be best served by maintenance of the embargo. The country has no significant defense industry and thus no interests in lifting the embargo. Therefore, Sweden adhered to the predominant public opinion towards China and the embargo. However, economic interests arose from the general trade with China. Related to the Dutch case, Sweden had to decide between different national interests and was under pressure from China but also countries as the Netherlands which changed their position. Sweden also portrays how fast countries can shift in their opinion towards a policy when, for example economic interests, emerge as a considerable interest. Following, also the Sweden case shows that economic interests interfere with a unified and common foreign policy.

The analysis of the four cases shows that during 2003 to 2005, France and Germany were able to convince other MS to rethink an end of the embargo. However, the assurance of Sweden and the Netherlands were tied to the statement that the human rights situation in China must be improved and a revised Code of Conduct should be adopted. Accordingly, the assurances of the two countries can only be understood as unassertive statements since under the given circumstances during that time both countries were not in favor of lifting the embargo. Thus, the change of opinion from the Netherlands and Sweden is not an approximation to a coherent foreign policy, but rather fueled the confusion about the opinions of the MS and the EU in total.

#### **4.2. To what extent is the CSFP hostage of sovereignty interests of its MS?**

Since the 1990s, the EU-China relations are exemplary for the discrepancy between promoting norms and values in their foreign policy on the one hand but not to achieving the necessary consensus among the MS to enforce these principles (Bendiek & Kramer, 2009). Contrary to many other policy fields of the EU, in the case of the GASP the MS were not willing to transfer sovereignty to the EU level. Therefore, the CFSP is not communitized and has no supranational but intergovernmental character (European Union, 2012). Consequently, the abolishment of the arms embargo requires the approval of all 27 MS. The issue of the arms

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<sup>34</sup> See Annex 9

embargo serves as a prime example for incoherent policy due to diverse interests: Especially China and human rights concerns split the EU MS in different interest groups and therefore, a common result is hard to achieve. In this context, it should be noted that when the embargo was established, the community consisted of only 12 MS. With more than twice as much MS as in 1989, it is considerably more difficult to find a consensus (Men, 2009). Through this MS's insisting on their sovereignty rights, the CFSP decision process regarding the embargo resulted in a "back-and-forth moving" (Holslag, 2011, p. 310) influenced by different interests of the MS regarding this issue. Next to diverse statements by the MS, also the EU institutions enmesh themselves in varying statements. The statement of the Council of the EU after the 7th EU-China Summit in The Hague: "The EU side confirmed its political will to continue to work towards lifting the embargo" (Council of the European Union, 2004, p. 2) was followed one year later by a contradictive declaration from the EU Parliament: "The EU Parliament is strongly opposed to the lifting of the China embargo until there is a clear and sustained improvement in the human rights and civil and political freedoms within that country." (European Parliament, 2005 (b.), pp. 10-11).

This lack of unity was not only confusing<sup>35</sup> for the Chinese government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2003) but also negatively affected the reputation of the EU as an international actor. It is claimed that "[u]ntil the EU institutions are equipped with the legal instruments and authorities to formulate and implement the whole range of foreign and security policy instruments, its relation towards China will continue to lack coherence and at times international credibility" (Berkofsky, 2005, pp. 21-22). Beijing utilized the disagreement and differing interests of the MS by subverting the embargo through bilateral trade agreements with the single MS (Fröhlich, 2008). This resulted in the fact that the embargo cannot be viewed as "coherent in implementation and scope" (Kreutz, 2004, p. 47) not least because regarding China, the EU MS almost always favor a tougher EU approach as they practice in their national foreign policies (Ash, 2011). Due to the rotary presidency in the EU Council which was still present during 2003-2005<sup>36</sup>, the MS currently holding the presidency could influence the process of reviewing the embargo according to their interest by deciding on the agenda for EU Council

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<sup>35</sup> "dealing with the EU as a whole versus dealing with the EU's individual MS?" (Berkofsky, 2005, p. 18)

<sup>36</sup> Abolished for the CFSP with the Lisbon Treaty

meetings. For example, the Irish presidency<sup>37</sup> rescheduled the decision on the embargo officially due to the enlargement of the EU in May that year. However, it is assumed that the Irish, sensitive to U.S. policy interests, were happy to have an excuse to postpone the issue (Kreutz, 2004): “Dublin would prefer to leave the issue up to the incoming Dutch presidency beginning in July” (Berkofsky, 2004 b.). This discordance between the MS indicates that when the states do not share the same interests it is a difficult and long task to agree on a common foreign policy. Due to the institutional architecture of the CFSP, the MS are empowered to influence the CFSP when, for example, occupying the EU Council presidency. As we have seen in the case of the Irish presidency, MS use this power to enforce their national interests.

Although, the MS are aware that the CFSP “[t]angle[s] Up in Bureaucracy” rather than become “a supranational organization capable of unified decision-making” (Peiran, 2010, S. 53), the MS are reluctant to transfer further sovereignty to the EU level. The reason behind it is simple: The intergovernmental character of the CFSP allows “allowed states to act in their own national interests, assert state sovereignty and prioritize their own benefit under the guise of a united front.” (Peiran, 2010, S. 53-54). With regard to the embargo, this has enabled MS to evade the sanction. But it also results in the fact that it is complicated to change a present decision: “This reality greatly diminishes the prospect of obtaining the consensus required to overturn the arms embargo.” (Peiran, 2010, S. 54)

Based on the mentioned theory, states are in a never ending conflict for power and control therefore, from a rational point of view, it is understandable that MS are anxious to keep several sovereignty rights. In this way, the MS can manipulate the CFSP according to their interests, however, the absence of a unified decision making instance in the CFSP causes delayed and divergent decisions. Following, the intergovernmental consultation and coordination between the MS in the CFSP interfere with a coherent policy.

### **4.3. Closure**

After many EU politicians have given oral statements in favor of lifting the embargo, however, the situation changed in 2005 (Men, 2009): In April that year, the EU Parliament concluded not to support a lifting of the ban. The parliament voted 431 to

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<sup>37</sup> January to June 2004

85, with 31 abstentions, in favor of maintaining the EU arms embargo towards China (European Parliament, 2005 (a.)). This very significant decision in favor of maintaining the arms embargo can be explained by several factors. Firstly, by strong pressure from the U.S. to keep the embargo influences many MS in their final decision (Men, 2009). Before, the EU had “received indications from the U.S. that the EU risked harsh sanctions should the China embargo be lifted” (Hellström, 2010, p. 18) such as a suspension of U.S. exports of military technology to the EU. Secondly, few months before<sup>38</sup> the EU parliamentary decision, China adopted the controversial Anti-Secession Law which threatens Taiwan with war, should it refuse a permanent union with the People Republic of China (European Parliament, 2004). Many MS perceived the adoption of the law “as deeply worrying” (Hellström, 2010, p. 17). Thirdly, domestic politics in the MS also caused a shrinking number of supporters of the embargo: On the one hand, “the defeat of Schröder’s (...) [party] in Germany’s largest state election NRW in May 2005 has put his position as Chancellor in jeopardy” (Tang, 2005, p. 319) and Angela Merkel rose to power. The subsequent change in the German government shifted the countries position as Merkel was close to the U.S. line and a pronounced supporter of the embargo (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2005). On the other hand, the constitutional referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005 are assumed to have affected and altered those countries decision on the ban (Tang, 2005). After these incidents and the EU Parliament decision, the debate about the arms embargo “came to a standstill” (Hellström, 2010, p. 38) and basically disappeared from the EU agenda (Vennesson, 2007).

Even if the parliamentary decision was made with a strong majority, also outlines the effect of national interests on the CFSP: The pressure from the U.S. became too strong and MS – especially those with a strong defense lobby - were too afraid to be affected by U.S. sanctions. Moreover, the passage of the Chinese Anti-Secession Law provoked great domestic resistance and refusal of the Chinese policy. Politicians were at risk to lose electoral votes when continuing to support the removal of the embargo. Finally, changes in domestic politics also imply changes in the state’s foreign attitude as we have seen in the case of Germany when the election of Merkel led to a change in the countries opinion towards the embargo.

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<sup>38</sup> 14th March 2005

## **5. Discussion**

In this part, implications are drawn from the data in order to verify or falsify my hypothesis. Several factors from my analysis verify that a coherent CFSP cannot be reached when divergent interests between MS exist.

Firstly, economic interests which influence a coherent CFSP are interpreted. From the data analyzed it can be concluded that divergent economic interests lead to an incoherent CFSP. Sweden and the Netherlands originally advocated a maintenance of the embargo while Germany and France featured divergent interests: The defense industry interests from both countries resulted in a strong support for an end of the embargo which led to a lack of unity within the CFSP. The policy towards the embargo became even more incoherent when the Netherlands and Sweden started to change their positions but still refused to accept an end of the embargo under the current circumstances in China. Aspirations for increasing trade affected the MS and eventuated in state leaders competing to be China's "best friend". It can be inferred that different and individual economic interest between the EU MS were present in the discussion about the arms embargo and that this debate was characterized by varying and inconsistent policies. Consequently, regarding the first sub-question the hypothesis can be verified: When divergent interests between MS exist, then no coherent CFSP can be established.

Secondly, sovereignty interests affecting the CFSP are construed. As drawn from the data, in the field of foreign policy MS are cautious to be "free from any higher legal authority" (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2008, p. 587). As seen in the analysis, the intergovernmental character of the CFSP interferes with a coherent policy since it is difficult to achieve the necessary consensus among the MS to enforce principles. Diverse interests towards China and the embargo split the MS and result in a long and confusing policy process. However, due to the struggle for power and control, MS are unwilling to transfer further sovereignty rights to the EU level although this could encourage a greater acceptance of the EU as an international actor. As a result, the hypothesis can also be verified in connection to the second sub-question. In the intergovernmental policy field of CFSP, divergent interest between the MS result in an incoherent policy since a supranational decision-making institution is absent.

All in all, the example of the arms embargo is a good example how national interests influence a coherent CFSP. From my analysis it proved right that national interests

usually feature a higher priority than common foreign and security policies. Therefore, the developed hypothesis can be verified that the existence of divergent interests between MS result in difficulties establishing a coherent CFSP.

However, during the analysis I realized that also other factors influenced the coherence of the CFSP. To mention here is the influence of the U.S. which exerted intense pressure on the MS and in this way changed many manipulated many MS attitude. Many authors claim that the end of the embargo was prevented by pressure from the U.S. (Hellström, 2010). China also practiced pressure in order to shape the MS opinion in their favor. Not to be neglected are the influence of domestic politics on national interest and the fact that the definition of national interests may change, as happened in Germany after the change of government. Merkel viewed German national interests handled best with a closer connection to U.S. policies and therefore stopped following Schröder's line on the embargo. This mitigates the statement of my hypothesis and shows that the development of policies also depends on other factors than purely national interests.

Further limits of my findings are threats to validity: Conclusions drawn from a case study generally feature a low external validity (Gerring, 2004). Observatory research "is understood to pose numerous problems of causal inference" (Gerring & McDermott, 2007, p. 697), namely internal validity. Therefore, no causal inferences and generalizations can be drawn from my findings. The quality criteria of reliability<sup>39</sup> and validity<sup>40</sup> according to Mayring can be regarded as fulfilled.

## **6. Conclusion**

Concluding, my research question - *To what extent is the CSFP hostage of national interests of its MS?* – is answered and an outlook for further research in this policy field is given.

I can conclude this thesis stating that the CFSP is – to a great extent - hostage to national interests. Although other factors also influence the CFSP, the results of my empirical analysis indicate that national interests are a decisive factor in relation to the character of the CFSP.

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<sup>39</sup> comprehensibility of the procedure

<sup>40</sup> quality of operationalisation

My results are largely consistent with the existing literature on the subject of the CFSP: while evaluating data in a qualitative content analysis I detected that the CFSP is determined by the coexistence of common and national policies as well as different interests of the MS. I analyzed the MS's national interests by observing their economic and sovereignty interests. The investigation revealed that MS's aspirations for increasing trade with China as well as MS's reluctance to transfer further sovereignty rights to the EU level influence the coherent appearance of the CFSP. Especially the discussion concerning the arms embargo outlined major problems of the development of the EU as a foreign actor: "representatives of MS have made independent statements, while the EU has been unable to deliver a common message" (Hellström, 2010, p. 8). A major problem within the MS is that apparently no one wants to pass the buck to Beijing, and everyone is trying to shift responsibility to other States. So far it has not been successful, to channel the prevailing competition<sup>41</sup> between the MS towards China.

Relations with China are a determining component of the CFSP; however, the debate about the embargo represents a conflict issue in the European-Chinese relations. Nonetheless, the Chinese were able to utilize varying policies by circumventing the incoherent CFSP through bilateral agreements. A "back-and-forth moving" of the CFSP and its MS regarding the abolishment of the embargo was observable: On the one hand, the Chinese exerted intensive lobbying which resulted in an increasing number of MS in favor of lifting the embargo in late 2004 (Hellström, 2010). On the other hand, many MS continued to have doubts on the human rights situation in China and significant influence from the U.S. affected the MS to keep the embargo.

In relation to the status of the EU as an international actor, the debate about the embargo "led to a loss of credibility in both Washington and Beijing" (Hellström, 2010, p. 19). As a result, the acceptance of the EU as a serious partner in international politics is less like to emerge.

Strengths of the thesis are that through the analysis of documents, factors which influence the MS opinion could be filtered out qualitatively. Furthermore, the arms embargo was a suitable issue to analyze diverse interests of the MS which shape the CFSP. Weaknesses of the thesis are the lack of generalization and that no causal inferences can be derived. The selection of the countries was also not representative.

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<sup>41</sup> Especially expectations of economic benefit



It will be interesting to see how the CFSP develops in future: Will the MS continue to preserve core areas of sovereignty similar to the "Westphalian model" of nation-states (Winkler, 2012)? Or will there be indeed a harmonized CFSP which could contribute decisively to the EU's position in the international community? The future performance of the CFSP does not only have significance for the policy field of European studies but also for international relations. Possible future research direction regarding this topic - which was not possible in the context of this thesis - could be an in-depth analysis of the pressure practiced by the U.S. on the one hand and by China on the other hand. This research could provide further insight into how far and through which factors MS are influenceable and vulnerable to blackmail. With regard to an external power such as the U.S. and China, this research could analyze whether MS counterbalance or bandwagon behind these external powers? Furthermore, it would be interesting to investigate on the issue why the policy field of foreign and security policy is still intergovernmental. Here a comparison to other policy fields - such as the economic and monetary policy where the MS agreed to transfer large amounts of national sovereignty to the EU level in order to create a supranational institution – could be conducted. Next to explanations why the CFSP is not within a supranational framework, this study can also point whether the CFSP is likely to develop into a supranational institution in the future.

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## Annex

### **Annex 1: Step model of deductive category application according to Mayring**

(Mayring, 2010, p. 99)






**Annex 2: Suppliers and Recipients of Major Conventional Weapons** (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2011, p. 12)

**THE SUPPLIERS AND RECIPIENTS OF MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS**

*The trend in transfers of major conventional weapons, 2001-10*



Bar graph: annual totals; line graph: five-year moving average (plotted at the last year of each five-year period).

*The five largest suppliers of major conventional weapons, 2006-10*

Supplier	Share of global arms exports (%)	Main recipients (share of supplier's transfers)
USA	30	South Korea (14%) Australia (9%) UAE (8%)
Russia	23	India (33%) China (23%) Algeria (13%)
Germany	11	Greece (15%) South Africa (11%) Turkey (10%)
France	7	Singapore (23%) UAE (16%) Greece (12%)
UK	4	USA (23%) Saudi Arabia (19%) India (10%)

**Annex 3: 10 largest Arms Producing Companies** (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2011, p. 10)

**THE SIPRI TOP 100 FOR 2009**

The SIPRI Top 100 list ranks the largest arms-producing companies in the world (outside China) according to their arms sales.

*The 10 largest arms-producing companies, 2009*

Company (country)	Arms sales (\$ m.)	Profit (\$ m.)
1 Lockheed Martin	33 430	3 024
2 BAE Systems (UK)	33 250	-70
3 Boeing	32 300	1 312
4 Northrop Grumman	27 000	1 686
5 General Dynamics	25 590	2 394
6 Raytheon	23 080	1 976
7 EADS (trans-Europe)	15 930	-1 060
8 Finmeccanica (Italy)	13 280	997
9 L-3 Communications	13 010	901
10 United Technologies	11 110	4 179

Companies are US-based, unless indicated otherwise. The profit figures are from all company activities, including non-military sales.

In general, the arms sales of companies in the Top 100 remained high in 2009.

The total arms sales of the SIPRI Top 100 increased by \$14.8 billion to reach \$400.7 billion in 2009.

In 2009 for the first time a Kuwaiti company—the military services company Agility—entered the Top 100, at rank 34. The arms sales of some of the largest Russian arms producers fell, even as the Russian Government continued to invest in the industry.


#### Annex 4: France Trade Statistics (World Trade Organization, 2010 (a.))

MERCHANDISE TRADE	Value	Annual percentage change		2010
	2010	2005-2010	2009	
Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US\$)	523 460	2	-21	8
Merchandise imports, c.i.f. (million US\$)	609 650	4	-22	9
	2010			2010
<b>Share in world total exports</b>	3.43	<b>Share in world total imports</b>		3.94
<b>Breakdown in economy's total exports</b>		<b>Breakdown in economy's total imports</b>		
By main commodity group (ITS)		By main commodity group (ITS)		
Agricultural products	13.1	Agricultural products		9.9
Fuels and mining products	6.4	Fuels and mining products		16.4
Manufactures	78.5	Manufactures		73.2
By main destination		By main origin		
1. European Union (27)	61.1	1. European Union (27)		59.9
2. United States	5.7	2. China		8.2
3. Switzerland	2.9	3. United States		5.9
4. China	2.8	4. Russian Federation		2.7
5. Russian Federation	1.6	5. Switzerland		2.4

#### Annex 5: Germany Trade Statistics (World Trade Organization , 2010 (b.))


MERCHANDISE TRADE	Value	Annual percentage change		2010
	2010	2005-2010	2009	
Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US\$)	1 258 924	5	-23	12
Merchandise imports, c.i.f. (million US\$)	1 054 814	6	-22	14
	2010			2010
<b>Share in world total exports</b>	8.25	<b>Share in world total imports</b>		6.82
<b>Breakdown in economy's total exports</b>		<b>Breakdown in economy's total imports</b>		
By main commodity group (ITS)		By main commodity group (ITS)		
Agricultural products	6.4	Agricultural products		9.6
Fuels and mining products	5.2	Fuels and mining products		16.4
Manufactures	86.0	Manufactures		72.0
By main destination		By main origin		
1. European Union (27)	60.3	1. European Union (27)		56.6
2. United States	6.8	2. China		9.5
3. China	5.6	3. United States		5.6
4. Switzerland	4.4	4. Switzerland		4.1
5. Russian Federation	2.7	5. Russian Federation		3.9

**Annex 6: Shares of German Exports in % (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008, p. 8)**



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**Annex 7: Shares of German Impots in % (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008, p. 9)**



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## Annex 8: Netherlands Trade Statistics (World Trade Organization, 2010 (c.))

MERCHANDISE TRADE	Value		Annual percentage change	
	2010	2005-2010	2009	2010
Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US\$)	574 251	7	-22	15
Merchandise imports, c.i.f. (million US\$)	516 409	7	-24	17
	2010			2010
<b>Share in world total exports</b>	3.76	<b>Share in world total imports</b>		3.34
<b>Breakdown in economy's total exports</b>		<b>Breakdown in economy's total imports</b>		
By main commodity group (ITS)		By main commodity group (ITS)		
Agricultural products	16.4	Agricultural products		11.9
Fuels and mining products	19.2	Fuels and mining products		23.8
Manufactures	61.5	Manufactures		61.7
By main destination		By main origin		
1. European Union (27)	74.1	1. European Union (27)		53.2
2. United States	4.5	2. China		9.3
3. Russian Federation	1.5	3. United States		7.5
4. Switzerland	1.5	4. Russian Federation		4.2
5. China	1.5	5. Japan		2.8

## Annex 9: Sweden Trade Statistics (World Trade Organization, 2010 (d.))

MERCHANDISE TRADE	Value		Annual percentage change	
	2010	2005-2010	2009	2010
Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US\$)	158 639	4	-29	21
Merchandise imports, c.i.f. (million US\$)	148 702	6	-29	24
	2010			2010
<b>Share in world total exports</b>	1.04	<b>Share in world total imports</b>		0.96
<b>Breakdown in economy's total exports</b>		<b>Breakdown in economy's total imports</b>		
By main commodity group (ITS)		By main commodity group (ITS)		
Agricultural products	8.9	Agricultural products		10.5
Fuels and mining products	12.4	Fuels and mining products		17.2
Manufactures	76.3	Manufactures		72.0
By main destination		By main origin		
1. European Union (27)	56.9	1. European Union (27)		67.8
2. Norway	10.0	2. Norway		9.0
3. United States	7.3	3. Russian Federation		4.8
4. China	3.1	4. China		4.1
5. Russian Federation	1.8	5. United States		3.2

## **Declaration of Academic Honesty**

I hereby declare to have written this Bachelor Thesis on my own. All parts that have been copied from academic books, papers, the Internet or other sources are clearly identified and the references fully cited.

Münster, 27.06.2012

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Lisa Peiler