



Inspecting policing
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Literature review - Police integrity and corruption

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1. Understanding 'corruption'

There is a sizeable body of literature that attempts to wrestle with the thorny issue of how 'corruption' might be defined. There is little need to review it all here, though the matter cannot be ignored entirely. What follows is a brief outline of why the issue of definition is of some concern, and an outline of the key terms used throughout this short review.

In short, there have been two main ways of approaching the issue of corruption. One looks at the different forms of behaviour and attempts to distinguish those actions that might be considered corrupt. The second seeks to construct a definition that can be used to separate corrupt from non-corrupt acts. In truth neither is entirely satisfactory. The problem is that corruption is fundamentally an ethical issue. The simple but uncomfortable fact is that complex ethical problems are an inherent part of policing. The consequence is that complete clarity around conduct is impossible. However, recognising this, and being prepared to discuss openly the problems and the complexities necessarily involved in policing, is an important part of the process of developing coherent administrative policy responses to such issues.

Even if problematic, however, thinking about the definition of 'corruption' is nevertheless a necessary element in understanding the issue. One of the leading scholars in the field offers the following definition:

'Police corruption is an action or omission, a promise of action or omission, or an attempted action or omission, committed by a police officer or a group of police officers, characterized by the police officer's misuse of the official position, motivated in significant part by the achievement of personal gain. (Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005: 16).'

This offers a fairly clear guide to the idea of corruption, containing several key facets of such conduct. However, it is overly narrow in one respect, and that is its focus on personal gain. Before returning to that issue, and using existing work (including Roebuck and Barker, 1974; Punch, 1985; HMIC 2011), it is worth looking at the variety of actions that might be included within a general categorisation of 'types' of corrupt/unethical activity by police officers. A reasonably comprehensive overview looks something like this:

Type of corrupt/unethical activity	Explanation
Corruption of authority	When an officer receives some form of material gain by virtue of their position as a police officer without violating the law per se (e.g. free drinks, meals, services); misuse of professional perquisites (credit cards etc)
'Kickbacks'	Receipt of goods, services or money for referring business to particular individuals
Opportunistic theft	Stealing from arrestees (sometimes referred to as 'rolling'), from traffic accident victims, crime victims and the bodies or property of dead citizens.
'Shakedowns'	Acceptance of a bribe for not following through a criminal violation, i.e. not making an arrest, filing a complaint or impounding property.
Protection of illegal activities	Police protection of those engaged in illegal activities (prostitution, drugs, pornography) enabling the business to continue operating.
The 'fix'	Undermining criminal investigations or proceedings, the 'loss' of traffic tickets, etc.
Direct criminal activities	A police officer commits a crime against person or property for personal gain 'in clear violation of both departmental and criminal norms'.
Internal payoffs	Prerogatives available to police officers (holidays, shift allocations, promotion) are bought, bartered and sold.
'Flaking' or 'padding'	Planting of, or adding to, evidence (argued by Punch to be particularly evident in drugs cases).
'Tipoffs' and inappropriate information disclosure	Activities ranging from offering advance warning of police activities to criminals through to the inappropriate release of information to the media
Inappropriate secondary business/employment interests – post-	Engagement in activities while employed as a police officer that might (or be thought to) conflict with existing role; taking up employment after leaving the

retirement employment	service raising similar ethical questions
Other forms of misconduct	Brutality; discriminatory practice; drinking on duty etc.

The first question to ask, therefore, is what do the matters above have, largely, in common? First, and picking up on Kutnjak Ivkovic's definition, they all, in different ways, **involve the abuse of position**. They involve some compromise of the 'special trust' enjoyed by police officers. Such abuse of position may involve acts that are illegal – the commission of criminal acts or abusing trust to enable or ignore criminal acts – but it is important to recognise that corruption does not necessarily imply the existence of criminal activities. Activities such as acceptance of gratuities (though this is itself far from cut and dried) and 'kickbacks' are not criminal but would often be considered unethical. Indeed, while corruption is generally thought of as actions involving the abuse of position, there is also a range of activities that are not illegal and do not necessarily involve either the exchange of money or other material goods. An example of this is the inappropriate disclosure of information or evidence which would, similarly, be regarded as unethical (HMIC, 2011). It is important to recognise therefore that conduct may be corrupt, even where the actions are not illegal and the ends being sought are – in organisational terms - legitimate ones ('over-zealous policing with the aim of personal advancement' (Newburn, 1999) for example). The problem with Kutnjak's definition is that it focuses on *personal* rather than *organisational gain*. The latter, as the long history of police corruption amply illustrates, is a crucial in understanding such conduct.

Kutnjak Ivkovic (2005) offers two defences for leaving out unethical conduct for organisational rather than personal gain from the definition of corruption. First, she suggests that because so-called 'noble-cause corruption' has different causes and involves different control efforts to other types of corrupt activity, it deserves to be thought of as a separate category. Second, she suggests that because corrupt actions for personal gain involve 'something inherently more deviant and would probably be viewed as substantially more serious' than corrupt acts for organisational benefit, again they should be treated separately. Both arguments are unconvincing. It is not clear that acts for organisational benefit are necessarily perceived to be the most serious breaches of trust by a police officer, nor is it the case that causes and control efforts in such cases are necessarily all that different. Indeed, in practice the overlap is very great. As a result, there are good reasons for considering Kleinig's (1996:166) definition of corrupt conduct to be the most useful in this field. In his view:

'Police officers act corruptly when, in exercising or failing to exercise their authority, they act with the primary intention of furthering private or departmental/divisional advantage.'

Though some will disagree with such an inclusive definition – one that inevitably encompasses quite a wide range of low-level, ethically-problematic conduct rather than more obviously serious misconduct – the argument is that such acts should be included as they are motivated by what the Wood Commission in Australia called 'the *spirit* of corruption' (Wood, 1997a); that is to say the primary intention behind such acts, like more serious forms of corrupt conduct, is the **furtherance of private or organisational advantage.**

Although the bulk of literature – this review included – tends to begin with an attempt to offer some form of definition of corruption, the reality is that the primary function of such an activity is to offer the basis for analysis rather than a cut and dried method of distinguishing corrupt from non-corrupt conduct. The conclusion from the most telling analyses of police conduct is that the matter of police corruption is fundamentally one of ethics. That is to say, there will be some generally serious forms of conduct that it is easy to agree should be seen as 'corrupt'. There are others, however, where much depends on the nature and circumstances of the conduct itself. The issue of 'gratuities' is often used to illustrate such arguments, in part because a free cup of coffee or a free meal would be unlikely to be considered by anyone (senior officer or member of the public alike) to be a serious breach of any code of conduct but, simultaneously, it is also recognised that the offer of such gratuities may contain the potential for inducing conduct which would be considered inappropriate. Some police departments, and some academics, take the view that the acceptance of any gifts 'regardless of their value, should be regarded as police corruption' (Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005: 26-7). However, 'the reality is that enforcement of such official rules is at the very least challenging – and may be unrealistic. At the same time, it is equally challenging to draw the line by determining a particular amount that would separate ethical from corrupt behaviour and to find an acceptable justification for that line' (2005: 27). As a consequence, the answer to the question of whether the acceptance of small-scale gratuities is appropriate is in practice rarely a clear 'yes' or 'no' but is, rather, a matter for ethical assessment. The questions that then arise for police organisations concern whether their officers and staff are trained to make, and are capable of making, such ethical judgments. We return to issues of training and ethics later. The next issues to consider – again, very briefly – are the sources and causes of unethical/corrupt conduct.

‘Bad apples’

When corruption is uncovered there is a tendency within organisations, including the police service, to suggest or imply that the problem is one that is confined to a few rogue members or ‘bad apples’. This canard can be dealt with quickly. First, whilst it is perfectly possible, on occasion, for an individual, or a small number of individuals, to engage in highly unethical conduct, the history of policing has too many examples of institutionalised corruption for this ‘explanation’ to carry much credence. Moreover, the notion of ‘bad apples’ has a number of far-reaching and potentially damaging implications. First, it narrows the scope of attention, often directing concern away from others – often those in positions of power and authority – whose conduct also ought to be subject to critical scrutiny. Second, it implies that, barring the individual ‘bad apples’, everything in the organisation is otherwise sound. This is rarely the case. Third, and linked to this earlier point, the very notion of ‘bad apples’ implies little is required other than the investigation and punishment of these individuals. Punishment, often severe, of a small number of individuals therefore becomes the default response to a corruption scandal.

Such a response is flawed in at least two ways. It is informed by general deterrence theory, and assumes that such punishments will ‘send out a message’ to other officers about expected standards of conduct. This may have some substance but the evidence for any deterrent effect is not strong (Tonry, 2008). Worse still, as suggested, such an approach fails to identify all those likely to be implicated in the ‘wrongdoing’ (often failing to hold supervisors or managers to account for example) and also fails to confront the structural problems or issues that tend to underpin the misconduct at the centre of the scandal. Indeed, there is little that could be more damaging to the health of the police service than recourse to a ‘bad apples’ explanation in response to corruption. As the American reformist Commissioner, Patrick V Murphy, once put it: “The task of corruption control is to examine the barrel, not just the apples – the organization, not just the individuals in it – because corrupt police are made, not born.” (quoted in Barker and Carter, 1986: 10). What, then, are the primary factors in police corruption?

‘Constant’ and ‘variable’ factors in corruption

There are features of policing – central to its nature – that are always present and which mean that corruption is an ever-present possibility. There are also other ‘variable’ factors, which are present from time to time and which influence the likely extent of corruption. The constant factors are:

- **Discretion:** the freedom to make decisions as to courses of action is central to professional policing
- **Low managerial visibility:** much policing is done away from the view of supervisors
- **Low public visibility:** much policing is done away from the view of the public
- **Peer group secrecy:** police ‘culture’ is characterised by a high degree of internal solidarity and secrecy, and the so-called ‘blue wall of silence’ often protects wrongdoers
- **Managerial secrecy:** managers often share the values and culture of those they manage
- **Association with lawbreakers/contact with temptation:** police officers inevitably come into contact with a wide variety of people – from individual citizens to organised criminals - who have an interest in subverting ethical, professional policing.

The main ‘variable’ factors are:

- **Community and political context:** the extent to which corruption is tolerated more broadly
- **Organisational integrity and control:** the extent to which the police organisation is appropriately led and managed
- **Opportunities for corruption:** the extent and nature of contact with what is usually referred to as the ‘invitational edges’ of corruption (Manning and Redlinger, 1977): primarily ‘vice’ (the drug and sex industries in the main) and regulatory activities (construction, traffic and licensing etc.)
- **Governance:** (externally) the extent to which, and the means by which, the police organisation is itself overseen and held to account, and (internally) the resources committed to, and emphasis placed on, integrity and corruption control.

- **‘Moral cynicism’**: the extent to which officers develop a jaundiced view of the world

The ‘Dirty Harry’ problem

The list of ‘constant’ and ‘variable’ factors in police corruption illustrates two very simple but important points. The first is that the very nature of policing means that the potential for corruption is always present – there are many facets intrinsic to policing that make it vulnerable to various forms of misconduct. Second, and to reinforce the point made earlier, tackling corruption is by no means straightforward, with the range of factors involved needing to be matched by a wide range of preventive and investigative measures. Before moving on, it is important to return to the issue of so-called ‘noble-cause corruption’, or corruption for (primarily) organisational gain, for it remains a matter of particular importance within discussions of police corruption and integrity. ‘Noble-cause corruption’ concerns the extent to which it is reasonable to use ‘dirty’ means to achieve ‘noble’ ends. In the literature, debates around this question are often summarised as the ‘Dirty Harry’ problem. This is derived from the Clint Eastwood movie in which the protagonist, a San Francisco detective who, in his attempts to save a young woman who has been abducted, uses increasingly unconventional (unethical/illegal) means to do so. He fails, but what the movie, and novels by the likes of Dashiell Hammett, Raymond Chandler and numerous other films and TV shows ask of us, is whether we side with ‘justice’ or with the ‘dirty’ cop trying to save an innocent victim?

The issue of ‘noble-cause corruption’ is important for a number of reasons. First, there is evidence that concerns about matters such as ‘perverting the course of justice’ rank high among members of the public (IPCC, 2011). Second, it appears that allegations about irregularities in relation to evidence and perjury are among the more frequent complaints from members of the public about police conduct (IPCC, 2011). Finally, there are suggestions that there are aspects of police culture, including the emphasis on performance targets, which increase the pressure, as one CID trainer put it to HMIC inspectors, on officers to ‘operate at the edge of the ethical envelope’ (HMIC, 1999).

Is there a simple answer to the ‘Dirty Harry’ problem? Some would say ‘yes’, and that the answer is that ‘dirty’ means can never justify so-called ‘noble’ ends. In fact, there are few who would openly disagree. And yet it is clear from studies of policing in practice that some officers, and some in supervisory or managerial roles, occasionally tacitly endorse such conduct. That this is the case would come as no surprise to the late, distinguished scholar of police corruption, Carl Klockars. In his classic treatment of the subject, he suggested that this was another area of ethical complexity and that, in reality, it is a problem to which there is no easy resolution for the police service. It is not that he supported the

use of 'dirty' means; simply that he recognised not only that 'Dirty Harry' dilemmas are intrinsic to policing, but that there would inevitably be people both within the police service and outside it who would wish officers to have, as he puts it, the 'moral courage and sensitivity' occasionally to bend rules in order to achieve unquestionably good ends. This, to repeat, was not to defend such means – he suggests resorting to them inevitably 'taints' policing – but rather to recognise the inevitability of such dilemmas within policing. The strength of his argument is that it doesn't resort to the simple formula of moral certainty – 'good ends' can never justify 'dirty means' – but, rather, accepts that officers are inevitably confronted with difficult decisions and that the resolution of such problems is itself complex. Nevertheless, the only way that we can ensure that dirty means will not be used too readily or too crudely is to punish those who use them and the agencies that endorse such means. Yet:

'In urging the punishment of policemen who resort to dirty means to achieve some unquestionably good and morally compelling end, we recognise that we create a Dirty Harry problem for ourselves and for those we urge to effect such punishments. It is a fitting end, one which teaches once again that the danger in Dirty Harry problems is never in their resolution, but in thinking that one has found a resolution with which one can truly live in peace.' (Klockars, 1980: 47)

In short, and rather like the question of 'gratuities', the answer is to engage officers in a dialogue that both accepts the complex moral world they are asked to inhabit, and recognises the difficult ethical decisions which they will almost certainly be asked to make.

2. A very brief history of British police corruption

From the earliest days of the Bow Street Runners, through the formation of the New Police in the 1820s, to the phone hacking scandal of recent times, policing in the United Kingdom has been punctuated with examples of malpractice and misconduct. The range of corrupt activities uncovered has included the concealment of serious crimes, bribery, the fabrication and planting of evidence, the commission of serious crimes including allegations of murder. The Royal Commission on the Police, established by RA Butler in 1960 under the chairmanship of Sir Henry Willink, was prompted in part by a number of cases of alleged or actual misconduct and one in particular in Brighton in which there was evidence of corruption. In the event, two officers were convicted, though the chief constable, also accused of criminal conspiracy, was acquitted. The judge commented that despite the acquittal, the chief constable emerged with serious question marks against his character and professionalism. He was later dismissed by his Watch Committee though, on appeal, subsequently had his pension reinstated.

Despite a glowing endorsement of British policing by the Royal Commission, allegations of corruption were to emerge shortly after its *Final Report*. As the Police Bill (subsequently to become the Police Act 1964) was passing through parliament, the local press, and subsequently national newspapers, began to print allegations concerning brutality by officers in Sheffield. The case led to the termination of the careers not just of the officers from the Crime Squad accused of assaulting witnesses, but also of senior officers. In a pattern that has subsequently become well-established in the corruption literature, the initial reaction within the force to the allegations was to attempt to cover them up, and in the highest echelons, to act to minimise the impact on the force. In a move prompted and supported by the Home Office, the chief constable and the senior investigating officer (a chief superintendent) were subsequently suspended from office pending an inquiry by the watch committee. A short time later, the chief constable resigned as did the detective chief superintendent – both, in effect, jumping before they were pushed.

A second case, which also emerged in mid-1963 and involved allegations of police brutality, concerned a detective sergeant in the Metropolitan Police Service: Harold Challenor. The case came to light in the aftermath of a series of arrests that were made by Challenor and others at a protest demonstration during a royal state visit. Challenor, it was shown in court, had planted evidence on a number of suspects (the evidence being 'half-bricks'), not only in this case but in a series of others. What was equally disturbing was the discovery, after examination, that Challenor was suffering from quite serious mental ill-health but

had been allowed to carry on in his duties. This was another case, not just of serious misconduct, but a failure of line management. Interestingly, given what was to surface in the Metropolitan Police Service later in the decade, one of the recommendations from an inquiry set up into the Challenor affair was that there should be greater integration of CID and the uniformed branch, together with much greater attention to record-keeping and evidence-handling.

In the space of fewer than ten years, at least four separate corruption scandals involving Metropolitan Police officers were uncovered. It all began with journalists from *The Times* tape-recording conversations between detectives and criminals in which the covering-up of serious crimes was being discussed. Equally shocking to many was the apparent inability of those investigating the abuses to bring anyone to justice. Other scandals emerged, in particular concerning the Drug Squad and the Obscene Publications Squad (Cox et al, 1977). There were even allegations toward the end of the 1970s that detectives had been involved in major armed robberies. Even the appointment of a reformist Commissioner, Sir Robert Mark, failed to break the cycle of scandal followed by failed investigation. The huge and heralded *Operation Countryman*, established by Mark's successor, Sir David McNee, petered out in an unseemly exchange of allegations and counter-allegations of malpractice, incompetence and corruption.


The criminal misconduct highlighted in the late 1960s and 1970s was closely followed by a series of miscarriages of justice, uncovered mainly in the 1980s, in which a range of abuses, including the suppression of evidence, the beating of suspects, and tampering with confessional evidence and perjury, were found to have occurred. An earlier case involving the murder of Maxwell Confait and subsequent overturning of the convictions of the two men initially convicted on the basis of their confessions, led more or less directly to the establishment of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure and, subsequently, to the passage of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The cases uncovered during the 1980s – the Birmingham Six, the Guildford Four, the Carl Bridgewater affair, and the activities of the West Midlands Serious Crime Squad – involved activities often misleadingly referred to as 'noble-cause corruption' – described earlier as the use of illegitimate means to secure institutionally legitimate, or desired, ends.

That corruption is, as the literature on the subject suggests, something which is an ever-present issue for the police service as illustrated by the range and plentiful nature of allegations that have arisen in the period since the major miscarriages of justice in the 1970s and 1980s. The cases, some (in)famous and others less so, include allegations of:

- cover-ups and corruption in relation to the Brinks Mat robbery;
- possible impropriety in the Stephen Lawrence murder investigation;
- inappropriate relationships with news organisations, including the sale of information and alleged undermining of investigations in the 'phone-hacking' scandal;
- misuse of the 'supergrass' system, including the manufacture of evidence;
- deliberate promotion of misinformation in relation to the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes;
- possible impropriety linked to both the murder of the private investigator, Daniel Morgan, and in connection with the subsequent investigation; and
- significant misconduct by undercover officers (as members of the Special Demonstration Squad), including criminal activity and perjury.

There are a great many others and a growing body of literature, of various sorts, has emerged to document some of the more significant cases (see, for example, Gillard and Flynn, 2012; Hayes, 2013a and b; McLaughlin and Hall, 2007; Evans and Lewis, 2013; Davies, 2014). To reinforce the point, a 2011 report by the IPCC noted that approximately 10 percent of the annual referrals it receives concern allegations of corruption:

Type of corruption referral to the IPCC 2008/9 to 2010/11



- **Perverting the course of justice:** incl. falsification of records or witness statements, perjury, and tampering with evidence
- **Misuse of systems:** incl. the unauthorised access of police systems for personal gain, including on behalf of friends or family
- **Unauthorised disclosure:** incl. the disclosure of personal details of offenders, suspects or civilians; crime report information; or information that could jeopardise a court case
- **Abuse of authority:** incl. the abuse of the trust or rights of a colleague or civilian and the misuse of police power and authority for organisational or personal gain
- **Theft/fraud:** incl. theft while on duty; fraudulent expense or overtime claims; and unauthorised personal use of police credit cards.

What are we to take from this? The answer is the simple and well-established fact from a vast body of literature that shows, despite suggestions that recent years have seen a decline in systemic corruption in UK policing (Transparency International, 2011), not only is it unlikely that corruption could ever be eliminated but any complacency about its existence or lack of realism about what it is necessary to prevent and control such conduct will quite quickly lead to the (re)-emergence of a serious problem.

3. The literature on corruption: its extent and value

There is now a fairly extensive body of literature on the history and nature of police corruption as well as an expanding body of literature on efforts to tackle corruption and to protect and/or stimulate integrity. As mentioned earlier, there is now a growing body of work looking at aspects of police conduct in the UK, the bulk of it by investigative journalists and former police officers, much of which is uncovering – or at least making public – details about some of the more significant problems alleged to have affected, or be affecting British policing. Both domestically and internationally, and very understandably, much of the extant literature on corruption emanates from jurisdictions that have (a) considerable experience of police corruption, and (b) have initiated major inquiries and reform programmes in response to such experiences. The main reports from the major commissions are generally of great value in that, despite the fact that the majority are rather dated, they offer significant insight into the problem of corruption, the difficulties of uncovering corrupt conduct, the strategies most commonly adopted in response to the identified problems, and the often short-term impact of any changes that are instituted. The main reports worthy of significant scrutiny are those from: Knapp Commission (New York City) (Knapp, 1972); Mollen Commission (New York City) (Mollen, 1994); Fitzgerald Commission (Queensland) (Fitzgerald, 1989); Wood Commission (New South Wales) (Wood, JRT, 1997a and b).

The last decade or so has seen an increasing number of studies, though they are still small in number, which attempt to measure the extent and nature of police corruption. The best known, and most rigorous, are those undertaken by the late Carl Klockars and colleagues (Klockars et al, 2000; Klockars et al, 2005; Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2003). Such work is, by its very nature, subject to some very considerable limitations, not least because of the ‘invisibility’ of much of the conduct itself, and the well-documented unwillingness of officers to reveal information about such conduct (Skolnick, 2002; Westmarland, 2005). The bulk of the literature, about police corruption specifically, or corrupt activity more generally, has increasingly sought to identify ‘indicators’ of corruption (see, in particular, Transparency International, 2012; 2013).

Finally, there is now a substantial and impressive body of work on trust and confidence in policing (see, in particular, Hough et al, 2010; Jackson et al, 2012a; Jackson et al, 2012b) which, in particular, takes Tom Tyler’s research on ‘procedural justice’ and applies it to policing. Such work, reflecting elements of Tyler’s earlier studies (e.g., Tyler, 2006), strongly suggests that the greater the extent to which citizens feel their interactions with police officers are characterised by procedural fairness, the greater the likelihood they are both to

want to, and actually will, comply. The implications in the field on corruption and misconduct are potentially profound. Most obviously, such work underlines the potentially hugely deleterious consequences of police actions that are perceived to be illegitimate or unfair and reinforces, were it necessary, one of the key reasons why corrupt conduct is such an important matter. In addition, however, it also points to the fact that police departments seeking to deal with corruption, and to enhance integrity, also need to be seen to operate fairly and legitimately with members of those organisations.

4. Approaches to tackling corruption and enhancing integrity

There is now a significant body of evidence from a variety of jurisdictions about anti-corruption efforts. In the main, the lessons from this evidence have changed little in the last decade or so (for an earlier comprehensive review see Newburn, 1999). Some of the central lessons now have more supporting evidence, and there is material from a broader range of countries than was available a decade and a half ago. Nevertheless, the central messages remain largely unchanged. These, in short order, are that:

- although there are many barriers to successful corruption control, there is evidence that police agencies can be reformed;
- reform needs to go beyond the immediately identified problem;
- reform must look at the political and task environments as well as the organisation itself;
- reform tends not to be durable; and
- continued vigilance and scepticism are vital.

At the heart of much contemporary corruption control there is the matter of police integrity, and the related issues of how this might be simulated and protected. Police integrity is best thought of as ‘the normative inclination among police to resist temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation’ (Klockars et al, 2006: 1). This definition of integrity used by Klockars and colleagues has five components:

- It is **normative**: that is to say it concerns beliefs, not just conduct; it is morally charged in that it is explicitly about ‘right’ and ‘wrong’; and, it combines a belief with an accordance to behave in line with that belief.
- It involves an **inclination to resist**: it acknowledges that it is only one source of resistance to misconduct, but it is likely to exert some pressure.
- It focuses on ‘police’ rather than ‘police officer’ or ‘officer’ because it is not reducible to the characteristics of individuals but, rather, can also be a characteristic of groups and organisations.
- By focusing on **temptation** it draws attention to the different environments in which police operate and makes these crucial to understanding conduct.

- At its core lies the notion of **abuse**, recognising that corruption is not innocent or defensible and cannot have 'noble' causes.

The promotion and reinforcement of integrity has become something of a staple in police organisations concerned with problems of corruption and misconduct. Indeed, commenting on perceived improvements in British policing, Transparency International (2011: 19) had the following to say:

'All the evidence points to a reduction in systemic corruption in the UK police force (sic). This has undoubtedly been aided by the much stronger integrity mechanisms put in place in recent years. Each force makes continual checks on corrupt activities, information-sharing is transparent (in terms of lines of accountability) and also well-co-ordinated.'

Writing at the same time, however, HMIC (2011) argued that many forces simply did not have the issue of integrity on their radar and went on to note that few organisations had resolved the issue of how to promote integrity successfully. As a means of both measuring and then exploring how police integrity might be enhanced American researchers used scenarios as the basis for examining officers' views as well as organisational approaches to the issue. Klockars et al (2006) asked 3,235 officers questions about hypothetical scenarios that tested a series of questions, notably:

- Do officers know the rules?¹
- How strongly do they support the rules?
- Do they know what disciplinary threat this agency makes for violation of those rules?
- Do they think the discipline is fair?

Officers were given 11 scenarios.² In their answers they indicated that they saw some violations as being much more serious than others. Four of the eleven cases were not considered very serious at all. These were scenarios involving the off-duty operation of a security system business, receipt of free meals, receipt of holiday gifts, and cover up of a police accident involving driving under the influence of alcohol. There were a further four scenarios involving behaviour that was considered moderately serious. These involved the use of excessive

¹ Their first question should have been are the rules clear? The (2011) HMIC report suggests that lack of clarity around some of the ethical issues is not uncommon and, logically, this requires clarification prior to officers being asked if they understand them.

² This work is now considered to have strong validity having been administered to more than 30,000 officers in 30 police agencies, and having been correlated with observers' ratings of agency integrity.

force on a car thief following a foot pursuit, a supervisor offering an officer time off during holiday in exchange for working on his personal car, acceptance of free drinks in exchange for ignoring a late bar closing, and receipt of a 'kickback'. Finally, there were three cases that were viewed as being very serious. They were stealing from a found wallet, accepting a financial bribe, and stealing a watch at a crime scene³ (Klockars et al, 2000).

Their conclusion was that integrity could be fostered in (at least) the following ways:

- treating integrity as something that is central to, and driven by, the organisation's culture;
- rules governing misconduct should be specified and officers trained in their application;
- the ways in which police managers detect, investigate, and discipline misconduct shows officers how serious they consider misconduct to be; and
- administrators should expressly require all officers to report misconduct.

This approach – one that seeks to combine clarity about rules and strong enforcement with a variety of approaches to fostering integrity – emerges from a sizeable criminological literature which points to the limitations of punitive approaches to crime control (for a review, see Nagin, 2013). Clarity around social and legal norms, and an ability to respond quickly and effectively to transgressions are an important element of any crime control system. However, like public health messages, in many ways the key is prevention.

Consequently, while it is important that forces investigate and punish misconduct, and are seen to do so, it is equally (if not more) important that they engage proactively in the stimulation and maintenance of an organisational culture which has **integrity** at its core. That is to say, and following the definition of integrity used earlier, the assumption must be that the processes through which integrity is maintained and enhanced in police organisations are different from strategies that pertain to individuals (Klockars et al, 2006).

To this can be added the observation that strategies should address all types of staff – civilian staff and officers at all levels. They should focus on work as well as non-work factors, and should involve arrangements for ongoing monitoring of the 'ethical health' of the organisation (Miller, 2003).

³ It should be noted that all but one of these scenarios concerns misconduct motivated by personal gain, the exception being the use of excessive force. It only measures one aspect of integrity, therefore. Nevertheless, the issues it raises are undoubtedly more generally applicable.

In what follows, and focusing both on corruption control and building integrity, strategies are divided into internal and external reform efforts (as is the case in most of the literature). The two, predictably, are linked but it is helpful, analytically, to think of them separately. Generally speaking, depending on the categories used, the literature identifies upwards of 15 core procedures or strategies used by police departments in tackling corruption and promoting integrity. Table 4.1 lists the primary internal and external control approaches identified by the literature.

Table 4.1 Strategies for tackling corruption and maintaining integrity in police agencies

Internal/external	Strategies	Detail
Primarily internal	1. Institutional reform	Covering a range of reforms (highlighted below) and often involving a flattening of hierarchies
	2. Detection and investigation	May be reactive (from intelligence or complaints) or proactive (from examination of records to integrity testing)
	3. Discipline and punishment of corrupt officers	From administrative discipline through to prosecution. Intention is both to punish and to deter
	4. Encourage reporting of misconduct/'whistleblowing'	Make every effort to break the 'blue wall of silence'; provide genuine support for 'whistleblowers'
	5. Monitor propensity for corruption	Increasingly organisations are monitoring 'risks', from the time of recruitment/selection, throughout officers' careers
	6. Enhance recruitment & selection procedures	Significant reform of the recruitment/selection process, with particular emphasis on integrity

	7. Enhance training of officers	In particular around ethics and integrity. Do officers understand the rules and expectations?
	8. Set official policies and enforce them	Wherever possible, clarity about expectations of officers is crucial. Not only must it be clear, but such standards must be enforced if they are to be taken seriously
	9. Establish robust internal supervision and accountability	A multitude of studies from a range of countries show failure of oversight to be a crucial element in problems of corruption
	10. Provide resources for control	There is little point in forces talking seriously about corruption control unless they have sufficient resources to deal with the issue
	11. Limit opportunities for corruption	Manage and monitor those areas of work where the risks of corruption are greatest
	12. Cultivate culture intolerant of corruption	Clear leadership at all levels promoting ethical conduct and encouraging the reporting of misconduct
Primarily external	13. Establish robust external supervision and accountability	Ensuring effective democratic oversight and control of local policing, including oversight of control efforts
	14. Detect and investigate corruption not investigated by the police agency	Support and where possible enhance the ability of external scrutiny bodies to examine allegations of misconduct and corruption

	15. Disseminate information about corruption and its control	Collect and disseminate robust information about levels and types of misconduct and responses to such behaviour
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Source: Adapted from Kutjnac Ivkovic, 2005; Prenzler; 2009; Transparency International, 2012

1. Institutional reform

One response to corruption scandals has involved major institutional restructuring or reform. In Belgium, in the aftermath of the Dutroux scandal, the official inquiry was highly critical of the segmentation of forces, and the rivalry between them, and recommended the creation of a single, national force (Punch, 2003). In Australia, Commissions of Inquiry appointed in the aftermath of major scandals in Queensland and New South Wales adopted much of then popular new managerialist theory in proposing sweeping changes to the respective police departments. Some of these proposals – particularly where they concern issues of management, recruitment and accountability – are dealt with below. However, on occasion, structural changes were also proposed, in particular focusing on the flattening of police organisational hierarchies (Fitzgerald, 1989) or as the Wood Commission (1997a) put it, ‘the absolute concentration on frontline policing in local area commands under a flatter management structure’ (quoted in Fleming and Lafferty, 2000: 162). Though proving any direct link, the Queensland and New South Wales forces claim that such changes contributed to the reduction in corruption problems in both jurisdictions.

2. Investigation and detection

Whatever the seriousness of the misconduct under consideration, there is general agreement in the literature that police agencies should commit significant resources to the investigation and detection of ‘corruption’. Unfortunately, the literature on police corruption is full of sorry tales of the failure of police forces properly to investigate allegations of, or intelligence concerning, corrupt practices (see, for example, McAlary, 1994) and it is vital that sufficient resources are committed to such activity (see below). In terms of investigation and the collection of intelligence, such activity can be what Sherman (1978) describes as ‘premonitory’ or ‘postmonitory’: that is, collected before/during or after the corrupt act. One of the first questions, therefore, is from where information/intelligence about such activities can be drawn? There are three primary sources: citizens; police officers themselves; and, proactive probing of police activities.

Citizens

Although corrupt police activity (like much police activity) is 'hidden', some intelligence will inevitably come from the public. The bigger question is how prepared and how well organised are police agencies to collect and respond to such intelligence? A number of issues arise here. How can police agencies ensure that complaints of corruption are properly and fully recorded? Second, how should police agencies treat anonymous reports of corruption and malpractice?

Police officers

The best source of intelligence is that from police officers: both 'honest' and 'corrupt' officers, though it is the latter who are of greatest use to investigators. Two assumptions about policing and corruption have made agencies shy away from attempting to use corrupt officers as a source of proactive intelligence gathering. The first is the continued dominance of the few 'bad apples' ideology, something which acts against long-term and sustained action against corruption. The second is that police agencies are often thought to be overridingly loyal and monolithic – the code of silence is too strong to allow officers to 'betray' their colleagues. That said, much effort in recent times has gone into trying to tackle the 'blue wall of silence' and we return to this subject below when we consider 'whistleblowing'.

It is more usual to rely upon officers believed to be untainted by allegations of corruption, and many of the more famous corruption inquiries – the Mollen and Knapp Commissions in particular - used the support of honest officers in the battle against corruption. In particular, under Commissioner Murphy the NYPD used its 'field associates' programme to recruit large numbers of officers to the cause of reporting on corrupt colleagues (McCormack and Ward, 1987).

Integrity testing and covert investigation

Much of the available evidence suggests that proactive investigatory methods are at least as successful as postmonitory approaches, if not more effective. Nevertheless, there appears to continue to be some reluctance among police departments to use such methods. The proactive detection of corruption by internal police units tends, understandably, to be more common in police agencies that have, or are concerned about, problems of corrupt practice. Internal affairs units are established in order to provide a secure internal investigative capability, as well as offering 'an excuse for being honest' (McCormack, 1987:155). The most common methods used in such proactive investigation are: informants; wiretaps; 'corruption patrols' (focused primarily on locations known for gambling, prostitution, drugs sales and illegal drinking would be observed for signs of 'payoffs'); and, integrity testing.

Integrity testing represents one of the more controversial tactics in corruption control but is an approach that has been increasingly used in recent times. In the UK the idea of integrity testing has been adapted as one of the proposed responses to the problem of racism (Macpherson, 1999), though such approaches – effectively changing the central question being asked from ‘is he corrupt?’ to ‘is he corruptible?’ (Marx, 1992) – raise a host of ethical questions, not least in relation to the danger of entrapment. Integrity tests can be administered both randomly (across the workforce) and selectively (on those where there is some intelligence or suspicion).

Despite the difficulties and the ethical dilemmas raised, integrity testing has become a central plank of corruption control within police departments that have experienced particular problems (both the NYPD and the Metropolitan Police have had periods at least where they have invested quite heavily in integrity testing). There are suggestions that it has been found to be an effective tool, though as yet there seems little published information that would allow such a claim to be fully assessed.

A report by KPMG in 1996 for the New York Police Department concluded that while random integrity testing was a potentially useful tactic, its success to that point did not justify its continuation, whereas targeted testing appeared to have had a far higher success rate (Prenzler and Ronken, 2001). Nevertheless, Transparency International (2000: 192) has claimed that:

‘There can also be no question that integrity testing is a tremendous deterrent to corrupt activity. The NYPD has seen a dramatic rise in the number of reports by police officers themselves of bribe offers and other corrupt conduct by members of the public and/or other officers since the integrity-testing programme was initiated. Some of this rise is undoubtedly attributable to the fact that NYPD police officers are concerned that their actions may be subject to monitoring and that even the failure to report a corrupt incident could subject them to disciplinary action.’

A variety of other ‘undercover’ techniques are used in corruption investigation, including surveillance; turn-arounds; body-microphones; and wiretaps. Covert surveillance became quite a common tactic in the NYPD and New South Wales Police after the Knapp and Wood Commissions respectively, with the latter suggesting that telecommunications interception was ‘an essential and cost-effective strategy’ against corruption (Prenzler, 2009: 143). Undercover operations in the field of corruption control, however, bring with them a number of risks – essentially the same risks that attach to any form of undercover police activity. Gary Marx points to a number of ethical and practical issues raised by proactive and undercover investigation of corruption:

- the potential stimulation of crime that would not otherwise have occurred;
- the redirection of resources away from crimes 'known' to the police towards 'possible offences';
- the potential involvement of police officers in criminal activity;
- inappropriate behaviour on the part of the state;
- the protection of criminals, and the non-prosecution of offences committed by those criminals, because of their 'usefulness';
- the potential violation of officers' rights;
- negative impact (though possibly short-term) on public attitudes toward the police; and
- negative impact on officer morale (Marx, 1992; Punch 1994).

Such ethical concerns, together with the financial costs and the mixed results that random testing has so far produced, have led to considerable restriction in the use of integrity testing within the police service, both in the UK and beyond.

Nonetheless, Prenzler and Ronken (2001) suggest a number of areas in which 'integrity testing' or, perhaps more accurately, 'behavioural audits' might reasonably be used, in particular in ensuring procedural compliance, including:

- how police respond to enquiries and crime reports from the public (HMIC, 1999);
- how internal affairs officers respond to complaints (Henry, 1990);
- how police conduct random breath tests and respond to attempted evasions by off-duty police (Homel, 1997);
- how police respond to approaches from ethnic minorities (Marx, 1992); and
- how police manage domestic disturbances and advise victims of domestic violence.

While intelligence from wiretaps, direct observation by 'corruption patrol officers', and integrity tests have all proved important in anti-corruption activities, existing evidence suggests that verbal testimony remains the most common source of information. Despite the predominance of standard policing techniques, and understandable concerns about the use of more proactive or ethically challenging methods of investigation, Prenzler and Ronken (2001: 339) conclude that: 'the frequent exposure of police to opportunities for corruption


and misconduct suggests that more pre-emptive strategies will be required to maximize ethical standards'. Thus, whilst the evidence for the extended use of random testing is currently quite weak, they suggest that this is a field in which, at the very least, further experimentation and assessment should undoubtedly occur.

3. Discipline and punishment of corrupt officers

As Prenzler (2009: 79) puts it, a 'robust and fair complaints and discipline system is essential to control misconduct, encourage public confidence in police integrity, and ensure the loyalty and confidence of honest police'. Given that the bulk of intelligence about misconduct derives from complaints it is vital that that system is easy to access, is appropriately responsive and itself transparent and accountable. By appropriately responsive, it is meant that the system should strike a balance between being seen to take allegations seriously whilst leading to responses that are proportionate to the nature of the misconduct being alleged. Picking up on this balancing act, Prenzler suggests that this tends to lead to a number of potential options, including:

1. A retrospectively oriented system that is procedurally fair and methodical, oriented toward finding the truth, and applying a just response.
2. A future-oriented system focused on behavioural improvements, primarily through efficient processing of complaints and dispositions centred on retraining or close supervision.
3. Future-oriented 'restorative' responses, centred on reconciling conflicts either through mediation between parties or efficient localised forms of communication, explanation and apology.

The standard approach within police departments in recent times has been organised around a Professional Standards Unit (or similar), responsible for the investigation of complaints. Such units differ from traditional 'reactive' complaints departments in that they 'proactively cultivate and analyse information or 'intelligence' on unethical police activity from a range of sources, and mount formal investigations into suspects thereby identified' (Miller, 2003: 2). PSUs are generally divided into an intelligence cell, and one or more operational team and Miller illustrates their general organisation in the following way:



Prenzler's (2009: 96) conclusion from his review of the experience of complaints and discipline systems is that the system should be 'inquisitorial, focused on finding the truth and achieving the best resolution of a matter, and removing officers who commit repeat breaches or serious offences. Punitive responses need to be balanced against remedial and restorative responses. Independent quality measures are essential to prevent backsliding into weak, biased, and ineffective processes'. How, then, are PSUs generally fairing?

Miller's research, though conducted over a decade ago⁴, still contains some important lessons for PSUs. In summary, Miller found that there remained both an absence of accurate information about, and considerable suspicion of, PSUs and that 'marketing' of their work within forces was important both as an aid to deterrence and to encourage co-operation. There remained issues relating to recruitment of staff, both in terms of attracting the best investigators to such work, and reintegrating them when they returned to other duties. Further, he suggested that more needed to be done to ensure that lessons learned within PSUs were agreed and implemented within forces. Finally, increased resources for professional standards, at both a regional and national level, would help complement and increase the capacity of force-level units. Finally in this regard, Miller goes on to outline a series of considerations, summarised in the following table, which impinge on decision-making around the investigation of corruption.

⁴ It is hard to escape the conclusion that further research in the field of police integrity and corruption ought to be a priority for the Home Office.

Factors to consider	Decisions		
	<i>What priority should be given to: developing intelligence/carrying out an investigation?</i>	<i>What are the objectives of an investigation?</i>	<i>Process decisions</i>
<i>Organisational risks</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are potential risks to operational policing posed by the unethical police behaviour? • What are potential risks to police resources? • What are potential risks to public confidence? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What individuals should be targeted in order to address the problem? • Are high profile convictions important for public or organisational confidence? • Will problem re-occur if it is not dealt with by achieving high-level outcomes (e.g. full criminal convictions)? • Will disruption tactics alone protect the organisation sufficiently? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are there ways of minimising organisational damage during investigations? • Are there ways of minimising organisational damage after an investigation?
<i>Public risks</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are there any risks to public safety posed by the unethical police behaviour? • Does the problem have an impact on the forces' ability to tackle crime problems of public concern? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What individuals should be targeted to ensure public safety? • Is a high-level conviction necessary to minimise public risks? • Will disruption tactics alone minimise public risks? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How can public safety be maximised during an investigation?
<i>Requirement for justice</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How serious is the unethical behaviour? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is it important to have 'full' justice for all individuals on moral grounds? • Will a lower-level outcome deliver effective justice? • Should all individuals implicated be tackled by an investigation? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is the investigation being carried out in a thorough and legal way?
<i>Prospect of success</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is an investigation likely to succeed? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What outcomes are most likely to be achievable? • What outcomes are most likely to stop problems from re-occurring? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is the investigation being carried out competently? • What are the threats to the success of the investigation? • Is the methodology legal?
<i>Resource implications</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are resources available? • Is an investigation likely to be expensive? • Are there other more pressing cases that should benefit from available resources? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are lower-level convictions or discipline outcomes less resource-intensive than convictions for full unethical activity? • Is it more cost-effective to disrupt the behaviour than to achieve convictions or disciplinary action? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are resources being used efficiently? • Are there more efficient methodologies?

The lengthy literature and history of police corruption is replete with references to, and accounts of, the impact of the so-called 'blue code/wall of silence' (Skolnick, 2002). In essence, a product of the solidarity and loyalty intrinsic to police culture, the code has been found by almost every serious commission of inquiry into police corruption. The Wood Commission in New South Wales (Wood, 1997a) suggested that the code of silence contributed to corruption in at least four main ways:

- for honest and inexperienced officers it influenced them to accept corruption as part of the job;
- for managers it engendered a sense of futility that corruption could be challenged or the police service reformed;
- for corrupt officers it was a means by which they could manipulate and control fellow officers; and
- for internal investigators it discouraged vigorous inquiry.

Central, therefore, to any successful set of strategies to investigate, detect and prevent police corruption are systems that encourage the reporting of misconduct or what might these days be referred to as 'whistleblowing'.

4. Encourage reporting of misconduct/ 'whistleblowing'

Unfortunately, there is very little research on the subject of police whistleblowing. An analysis of activity in the aftermath of the Fitzgerald Commission in Queensland found some indication that there was an increased willingness among officers to report misconduct, and this was linked to the greater likelihood of punishment where unreported misconduct was revealed (Brereton and Ede, 1996). Prenzler (2009: 85) concludes rather pessimistically that 'compulsory whistle-blower legislation is one of those things that is necessary in principle, but its effects on behaviour are unclear or likely to be weak' (see also, Johnson, 2005). At the very least Kutnjak Ivkovic (2005) argues, police agencies ought to reward the reporting of misconduct and guarantee anonymity to whistleblowers. Unfortunately, despite the development of considerably improved policies toward whistleblowing, it appears that their treatment with British public services still falls far short of what is required if misconduct is successfully to be tackled.⁵

⁵ www.theguardian.com/society/2014/aug/01/public-service-whistleblowers-treated-shockingly?CMP=tw_t_gu (accessed 12.8.14)

5. Monitor propensity for corruption

Corruption is an ever-present risk within police organisations and there is clear evidence that a failure to monitor risks is a crucial factor in the (re)-emergence of corruption scandals. Part of the danger lies in the assumption that the propensity for corruption is static and that rigorous recruitment and selection processes would mitigate the problem. Indeed, as we will come to shortly, recruitment and selection processes are a potentially important plank in corruption control systems and it remains important for police departments to be alive continuously to the risks and pressures that might conduce toward misconduct. There are an increasing number of tools available to police departments designed to aid the measurement of integrity (see, for example, Klockars et al, 2005) which, though imperfect, are claimed to 'have proven reliable and capable of measuring differences and changes in the organisational environments in which they have been employed' (2005: 253).

6. Enhance recruitment and selection procedures

One regular response by police forces that have experienced significant problems of corruption has been substantial reform of a whole range of existing recruitment and selection practices, and implementation of new procedures. A 1997 Commission on Police Integrity studying corruption in Chicago (the largest US police department outside New York City) recommended higher standards in relation to recruitment and screening (Commission on Police Integrity, 1997) and similar proposals can be found in the majority of the reports of the major Commissions of Inquiry into corruption. Such inquiries have tended to identify a number of problems with recruitment and selection. These include:

- overwork/under-staffing of recruitment departments;
- questionable competence/integrity of staff involved in recruitment;
- inadequate standards in recruitment (or failure to implement accepted standards) (LAPD, 2000); and
- insufficient background checking/investigation of potential recruits (Mollen, 1994; LAPD, 2000).

Prenzler (2009) lists the main elements of progressive recruitment for integrity as being the following:

- criminal history checks and automatic exclusion for disqualifying offences;
- character references, especially from employers;
- psychological tests that flag possible negative character traits;
- drug tests; and
- panel interviews that probe applicants' ethical awareness and personal principles, and follow-up investigations of possible adverse indicators.

In addition, he lists the following potential additions (all used in some police departments):

- Polygraph testing (Cochrane et al, 2003)
- Home visits (PEAC, 1998)
- Intelligence checks on associates (Ferguson, 2003)
- Higher recruitment age (Mollen, 1994)
- Personal financial checking (PEAC, 1998)
- Higher educational standards (Wood, 1997a).

As Klockars et al (2005) argue, the resources that an organisation allocates to such activities are indicative of the extent to which they take such matters seriously. Accepting that there will always be significant resource constraints, they argue that the bottom line in corruption control is the establishment of a set of clearly defined standards in relation to recruitment and the operationalisation of these standards with the utmost seriousness. The focus on recruitment, however, is only the first stage of a continuous process that involves training, both of new recruits and established employees.

7. Enhance training of officers

McCormack (1996), among many others, has suggested that it is quite possible to effect behavioural change within organisations as a result of the imposition of strong internal controls which heighten the risk of detection. However, this is far from sufficient and he argues that 'long-term change depends more upon internalizing new ethical standards' than it does on a more generally punitive response to misconduct (McCormack, 1996: 245). Both, it appears, are required.

Reforming training of recruits is perhaps the most common response among police agencies attempting to deal with corruption. Goldstein, writing in the 1970s, (Goldstein, 1975) noted that most police training avoided discussion of corruption, and work in the following two decades noted that little appears to have changed (Wood, 1997a; Mollen Commission, 1994). Critical scholarship at the time suggested that even on those occasions when discussion of corruption and ethics did form part of training, it was often done in a manner that was unlikely to resonate with new recruits or make much difference to subsequent behaviour (Goldstein, 1975).

Since the mid-1990s this has arguably begun to change – though there remains a long way to go. In the aftermath of the corruption scandal of the 1990s, the New York Police Department put particular emphasis on its new anti-corruption strategy, and this placed a heavy emphasis on ethics and values training for officers, especially those in supervisory positions (Giuliani and Bratton, 1995). The Wood Commission in New South Wales recommended that the teaching of ethics and integrity should be practically integrated in every aspect of police education and training in New South Wales, from recruitment, through continuing education to management training (1997a: 542).

In the UK, a series of reports has focused very significantly on training. HMIC's (2011) report recommended that: 'Training courses should include appropriate input in relation to integrity and anti-corruption. In particular, given the importance of leadership to securing high standards of integrity... the Strategic Command Course and the High Potential Development Scheme should encompass these issues.' Nevertheless, and illustrating the difficulties encountered in other jurisdictions, the 2012 follow-up report noted that education on integrity issues within forces was 'patchy' and was generally limited to generic training with, for example, only six forces at that stage providing 'well-structured training in relation to gifts and hospitality'. HMIC similarly found training within police authorities to be limited, and often limited to high-level statements rather than detailed policy and procedure. This should all be set against a background of research evidence – albeit still somewhat limited – which suggests that detailed, ongoing in-service training in relation to issues of integrity is vital in corruption control (Klockars et al, 2005; Graycar and Prenzler, 2013).

8. Set official policies and enforce them

The bulk of policing literature – both academic and professional – now recognises the central importance of a clear code of ethics to police performance. In part, the globalisation of policing has stimulated the development of standard setting, giving rise to a variety of protocols including the European Convention on Human Rights, the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, the Council of Europe's Declaration on the Police and the Council of Europe's Code of Police Ethics.

As with any change within organisations, it is policies that are changed first (and then, one hopes, that practices change in line with policies). The area of corruption control is no different and forces that have struggled with corrupt practices have sought to develop policies that would codify the standards of behaviour expected of staff and outline the general parameters of the organisation's response to the problem. An aspect of what Punch (1994) calls a model of 'positive social control' for police organisations is the role of what he refers to as 'codes and compliance'. In addition to formal rules and regulations, he argues that police forces should construct and adopt an ethical code that 'spells out a wider concern with integrity and ethical behaviour in police work' (1994: 34-5). Equal consideration needs to be given to the means by which officers will be encouraged or persuaded to comply with the standards set out in the code and we come to this below.

Finally, it is sometimes suggested that the adoption of codes will result in the unhelpful fettering of police discretion and, consequently, a diminution in police effectiveness (this links to the earlier discussion of 'Dirty Harry' problems). This, however, is not the logic of such codes. An elaborate structure of rules is inevitable, given the nature of policing. Such rules do not aim to suppress discretion, but simply to improve its exercise. At heart, as outlined earlier lies the issue of ethics, and there are well-established reasons for believing that an emphasis on ethics and integrity is important to tackling corruption in police departments (see Kleinig, 1996; Palmer 1992):

- ethics contribute to the image of law enforcement as a profession;
- a code of ethics helps to engender self-respect among individual officers;
- a code of ethics may contribute to mutual respect among officers and to the development of a positive esprit de corps; and

- a code of ethics provides guidance as to how the law should be enforced. There is, in this regard, a straightforward link between training, competence and malpractice/corruption. It means that the better officers are at using legitimate means, the less they will need to have recourse to illegitimate ones.

9. Establish robust internal supervision and accountability

Central to all accounts of successful corruption control is the existence and maintenance of robust systems for holding officers and staff – at all levels – to account. All the major Commissions of Inquiry into police corruption have highlighted failures of supervision and management and it has become standard practice to increase or tighten supervision in the aftermath of a corruption scandal. Indeed, one of the implications of the rejection of the ‘bad apple theory’ is that, in order to proliferate, corrupt practices need, at the very least, the implicit support of officers in supervisory and managerial positions. One of the key aspects in any strategy designed to tackle corruption is inculcating a sense of ‘responsibility’ for police integrity among staff in those positions. Punch (1994) refers to ‘positive symbolic leadership’. By this he means a form of leadership in which senior officers state explicitly and openly that:

- the ends never justify the means;
- they are running a ‘clean’ organisation even if this weakens their ostensible effectiveness;
- they will be as open as possible about internal deviance and will co-operate fully with external agencies; and
- they will personally serve as role models for integrity (Punch, 1994: 34).

The key point of ‘positive leadership’, he argues, is that it sends an unambivalent message to the rest of the organisation and to those outside the organisation. To this end, one recent review of policing and police leadership (Neyroud, 2011) called for the development of a police professional body with the aim that the service in the future should be: driven by public interest and outwardly focused; should evince a firm commitment to ethical leadership, human rights and equality; and should be responsible for professional standards for public service in policing.

Arguably the key issue for police agencies is how to ensure that those in supervisory and managerial positions take responsibility for tackling corruption. One method is to seek to diffuse responsibility for control of misconduct both vertically and horizontally within the organisation, for example by employing something akin to the idea of vicarious liability. The intention (vertically) is that managers should, in some way, be held responsible for the behaviour of their staff. This, the Mollen Commission in New York described as 'reinventing the enforcement of command accountability' (Mollen, 1994: 5). Simultaneously, the aim (horizontally) is also that peers should have an individual and collective responsibility for probity within the ranks.

10. Provide resources for control

In relation to recruitment and selection, earlier we noted that the resources committed to these tended to reflect the seriousness with which organisations take such endeavours. That particular point can be extended to the whole of corruption control more generally. There is substantial evidence that the cycle of scandal and reform that has been noted in so many jurisdictions is a cyclical one and that this, at least in part, reflects the rise and fall in the seriousness with which leaders take the issue of corruption and, consequently, the extent of the resources they decide to commit to such activities (Sherman, 1986). As the Mollen Commission put it in relation to the New York Police Department in the mid-1990s:

'From the top brass down, there was an often debilitating fear about police corruption disclosures because it was perceived as an embarrassment to the Department, and likely to engender a loss of public confidence... This attitude infected the entire Department, manifesting itself in different ways throughout the ranks. It encouraged the Department's top managers to allow corruption controls to wither through neglect and denial of resources, and to allow the principle of command accountability to collapse through lack of enforcement (1994: 70-71).'

11. Limit opportunities for corruption

There are areas of policing that, historically, have been found to be more prone to corruption than 'routine' police work. Many of these are predictable and include vice, drugs, undercover policing, informant-handling and, to a lesser extent, responsibility for placing contracts – all of which appear to be areas of vulnerability (Goldstein, 1975; Punch, 2000). Furthermore, there are also procedures that may inadvertently encourage corruption, including unrealistic productivity targets; inadequate means for paying informants; and,

insufficient funds for buying drugs from 'dealers'. One standard technique for reducing the likelihood of corruption therefore is to limit opportunities either by changing approaches to particular tasks or by introducing new procedures for managing and governing such work. Punch (2000) suggests three general lessons in this regard:

1. Specialised units – such units often work well, particularly well, and subsequently it is found that their activities have been unduly 'creative'. The lesson from a variety of jurisdictions, Punch says, is you have 'to distrust your best performers and high achievers'. Managers like to see positive results, but they also have continually ask how were such results achieved?
2. Senior officers – while there is a tendency to focus on those on the front line, senior officers have significant power and discretion, often placing them in vulnerable positions: 'No-one is immune to contamination, suspicion and scrutiny'.
3. The law – laws that are difficult or impossible to enforce, and where there is limited public support for enforcement, can provide the conditions that lead to corruption. Such laws need to be examined and changed.

12. Cultivate culture intolerant of corruption

Graycar and Prenzler (2013: 57) say that '[t]he best sign of organisational health and corruption resistance is an inbuilt acceptance that the agency insists on high standards of conduct from its employees. Rather than have big sticks for when standards are breached, agencies should build a strong culture of integrity that pervades the organisation. The foregoing ten points are essentially the building blocks of this observation. However, in addition to such corruption control, strategies such as improving investigation and detection procedures, developing a transparent and fair complaints system, establishing robust internal accountability procedures, having clear ethical standards and enforcing these, cultivating a culture that is intolerant of misconduct refers to the broader question of professionalism and pride in the job must be put in place.

That said, there is some disagreement in the literature over the significance of pride in integrity. A common hypothesis is that the more pride police officers have in their department, the more 'resistant' they will be to corruption. Fear of detection, Sherman suggests, appears to be 'causally prior to pride in integrity, at least in police departments in which corruption was once widespread' (Sherman, 1978: 144). On the other hand, there are those writing in the field of corporate or business crime, for example, who take the view that

deterrence via the threat of prosecution is less likely to have lasting long-term benefits than other more persuasive measures aimed at ensuring compliance (Braithwaite, 1989).

While cultivating a culture intolerant of corruption is presented here as primarily an internal matter, it also an issue that concerns those outside the police organisation, not least political leaders. That is to say, in just the same way that general lessons for police organisations point to the importance of valuing professional standards at all levels, so it is unlikely that police organisations will easily maintain high levels of integrity and conduct if their professionalism is denigrated by political leaders. Those outside the police service occupying roles in which they have oversight or governance responsibilities for policing have responsibilities, akin to police leaders, for the establishment and maintenance of a positive image of professional policing.

13. Establish robust external supervision and accountability

The literature on police corruption is effectively unanimous in pointing to the importance of robust external accountability systems as being central to corruption control. Thus far we have focused largely on internal systems, but there is good reason to believe that any system of corruption control is only as good as the external scrutiny systems that exist. There is a vast body of literature on police accountability and there is no need to review it here. Rather, one can simply point to the five core lessons that appear to emerge from an overview of corruption literature. We will return to the issue of police accountability in the concluding section.

- There is considerable evidence that local democratic control over policing is crucial both to public trust and confidence and to the successful functioning of police departments (Sen, 2010).
- Significant civilian involvement in review of complaints against the police is wanted by both the general public and by individual complainants. There is debate and disagreement as the extent of such citizen review, but now little demurral from the general principle (Bayley, 1991; 1994).
- There is a significant correlation between complainant satisfaction and citizen oversight of complaint investigation (CCRC, 1999; Hayes, 1997; Maguire and Corbett, 1991).
- Independent Commissions of Inquiry have proved important vehicles both for the uncovering of corruption and for the establishment of reformed police departments.

- Civil society organisations, including media organisations, can play an important role in police reform efforts (Transparency International, 2012).

Building on evidence that suggests that police agencies with significant corruption problems tend to have inadequate internal control systems, Kutnjak Ivkovic (2005) argues it is vital to have external bodies that control the police institution's control efforts. Whilst it might be thought that local police oversight bodies (city mayors, police authorities, police and crime commissioners) might reasonably play this role, Kutnjak Ivkovic argues that there are inevitably a variety of tensions that might mitigate the effectiveness of such a relationship. Similarly, other bodies such as investigative journalists, specialist commissions of inquiry and even citizen oversight panels all have shortcomings. In short, she says, current oversight tends to be 'assigned to institutions that are temporary (e.g., independent commissions) or sporadic (e.g., the media), institutions whose focus is either too wide or too narrow (e.g., the mayor), or institutions that at best have the authority to examine only some elements of the agency's control system (e.g. citizen reviews)' (2005: 157). The challenge is to design an institution, or set of institutions, that will effectively be able to oversee and control the police agency's control system as a whole on a continuous basis.

14. Detect and investigate corruption not investigated by the police agency

Successful corruption control also requires the investigation of corruption that is not, or is not adequately, investigated by the police agency. As with the previous point, once again there are likely to be a number of individuals or agencies involved in such work – lawyers, investigative journalists, individual citizens and citizen groups – again the likelihood is that such activity will be sporadic rather than continuous. The challenge is to design an institution/set of institutions that will tackle this problem more coherently, and one of the more radical proposals is for the establishment of a new institution called an 'integrity-enhancing agency' (IEA) that would become an integral element of the corruption control system. Its function would be the exclusive one of 'securing oversight over the police agency, continually monitoring its performance, and providing feedback about it' (Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005: 180).

15. Disseminate information about corruption and its control

Finally in this regard, and linking back to research evidence on public confidence and trust in policing and its clear links with procedural justice, there are strong arguments for the dissemination of information about corrupt practices. Although, understandably, there will be those that believe that increased publicity around misconduct would be likely to undermine public confidence, there are good reasons for thinking that the collection and circulation of robust information about misconduct is an important part of the control effort. Such information provides evidence as to the scale of the problem, it indicates that the police agency (and others) take the problem seriously and do not hide from it and, when the information concerns the investigation, detection and punishment of wrongdoing, provides some basis for deterring misconduct and enhancing integrity. Both the police service and external oversight bodies have responsibilities in this regard.

5. Conclusion

The lessons from the major corruption inquiries – from the United States and Australia in particular but reinforced by research and inquiries elsewhere – points to four general and long-standing lessons. These are that:

- scandal, and official public inquiries set up in the aftermath of scandals, can play a vital role in the establishment of successful corruption control strategies;
- although it may appear hard to tackle, corruption, including widespread and institutionalised corruption, can be significantly reduced if the right conditions prevail and the appropriate strategies are adopted;
- however, even in a ‘successfully reformed’ police agency, some low level corruption is likely to persist; and
- crucially, without extreme vigilance more organised corruption is likely to re-appear.

Police organisations inevitably carry the heaviest burden in corruption control. This will continue to be the case and the literature suggests that although there are no ‘silver bullets’, there are a variety of internal reforms that are associated with improved corruption control. In particular, the establishment and enforcement of clear rules and regulations regarding misconduct is vital. However, this is only one small part of the ‘solution’. The naturally complex nature of policing means that the issue of ethics is central to corruption control and placing ethical scrutiny at the heart of recruitment and selection procedures and within in-service training is vitally important to the development of a policing culture that is intolerant of corruption. Such intolerance, crucially, requires clear, consistent and robust management, and all the evidence points to corruption flourishing where management is lax or insufficient. External support is required both to support and foster a culture of professional policing, and to provide sufficient resources to maintain robust systems of corruption control. For all the internal reform efforts that might be operationalised, corruption control is unlikely to be successful without significant attention also being paid to external oversight and governance. Consequently, it is worth concluding by focusing on the more general nature of policing and the means by which it is successfully governed. Once again, whilst such issues raise necessary questions about institutional structures and powers, the reality is that much of this also boils down to values and ethics – that is, what we think we want policing to look like and how we want police organisations to operate in a democratic society.

As noted earlier in this review there is a huge body of literature on police accountability and police governance, and much has been written on the subject of so-called democratic policing. Such a notion is often discussed, but less often is it defined in any detail.

It is increasingly the case that reviews of policing now point to crucial values underpinning policing. Most commonly in the UK the tendency is to make reference to the general principles outlined by Sir Robert Peel in the early nineteenth century (see, for example, Transparency International, 2013), or updated versions of these principles (Independent Police Commission, 2013). Such statements of principle are undoubtedly helpful. It is also useful in thinking about the idea of democratic policing to focus on the values taken to be central to democracy and to consider how these might be applied to policing. Work by Jones and colleagues (Jones et al, 1994; 1996; 2012) has identified and applied seven core democratic values, each of which can be seen as playing a core role in how policing is organized and governed. In short, the seven are as follows:

- **Participation** – the ability of citizens to participate in discussion of policing policy and practice.
- **Equity** – The pattern of policing, and the distribution of policing resources, ought to be seen to be fair.
- **Delivery of service** – The police should deliver the appropriate services (as determined by other criteria) effectively and efficiently.
- **Responsiveness** – In determining the order of priorities, the allocation of resources between different activities and objectives, and the choice of policing methods, the police should be responsive to the views of a representative body.
- **Distribution of power** – Power to determine policing policy should not be concentrated but distributed between a number of different bodies.
- **Information** – should be regularly published on all policing matters (including misconduct). A representative body should be able to engage in a continuing dialogue with the professional managers of the police force so as to become better informed and to elicit relevant information through a sequence of interactions.
- **Redress** – It should be possible for a representative body to dismiss an incompetent or corrupt chief officer, or one who exceeds their powers. There should be effective means of redress for unlawful or unreasonable treatment by individual officers.

Together, statements of policing principles and democratic values offer a robust and codified means of outlining the general expectations of this complex and challenging public service. Within this general context a set of institutions, strategies and programmes can be developed which, collectively, offer the best chance of preventing systemic police corruption and investigating, detecting and punishing those forms of misconduct that do arise.

6. References

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